OIE Recognition of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Status of Members RESOLUTION No. XXI (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)
snip...
CONSIDERING THAT
1. Adoption of subsequent Resolutions* since the 67th General Session of the OIE International Committee has established a procedure for annually updating a list of Members, categorised by their BSE risk according to the provisions of theTerrestrial Code,
2. During the 70th General Session, the International Committee adopted Resolution No. XVIII asking Members applying for a BSE risk evaluation to meet part of the costs sustained by the OIE Central Bureau in the evaluation process,
3. During the 72nd General Session, the OIE adopted Resolution No. XXI requesting the Director General to inform Delegates of Members whose country or zones are recognised with regard to their BSE risk status should annually confirm during the month of November whether their risk status and the criteria by which their status was recognised have remained unchanged,
4. Information published by the OIE is derived from declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Members. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of a Member disease status based on inaccurate information, changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau, subsequent to the time of declaration of the BSE risk status.
THE COMMITTEE
RESOLVES THAT
1. The Director General publish the following list of Members recognised as having a negligible BSE risk in accordance with Chapter 2.3.13. of the Terrestrial Code:
Australia, Argentina, Finland, Iceland, New Zealand, Norway, Paraguay, Singapore, Sweden and Uruguay.
2. The Director General publish the following list of Members recognised as having a controlled BSE risk in accordance with Chapter 2.3.13. of the Terrestrial Code:
Austria Belgium Brazil Canada Chile Chinese Taipei Cyprus Czech Republic Denmark Estonia France Germany Greece Hungary Ireland Italy Latvia Lichtenstein Lithuania Luxembourg Malta Mexico Netherlands Poland Portugal Slovak Republic Slovenia Spain Switzerland United Kingdom United States of America
AND
3. The Delegates of these Members will immediately notify the Central Bureau if BSE occurs in their countries or their territories.
_________
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)
* 67th General Session (GS) Resolution No (Res) XVI and Res XI; 69th GS Res XV, and 71st GS Res XXII, 72nd GS Res XXIV and Res XXI..
http://www.oie.int/eng/info/en_statesb.htm?e1d6
IN A NUT SHELL ;
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,
http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf
bought and paid for by your local cattle dealer $$$
Attachment to Singeltary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8152
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 Date: January 9, 2007 at 9:08 am PST
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f3412
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
APHIS-2006-0041-0006 TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Tuesday, June 3, 2008 SCRAPIE USA UPDATE JUNE 2008 NOR-98 REPORTED PA
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/scrapie-usa-update-june-2008-nor-98.html
NOR-98 ATYPICAL SCRAPIE 5 cases documented in USA in 5 different states USA 007
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/04/seac-spongiform-encephalopathy-advisory.html
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/
SCRAPIE USA
http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/
8. Human susceptibility to CWD
Millions of North Americans hunt deer and elk (U.S. Department of the Interior, Census Bureau), and there is no doubt that people have been exposed to CWD through venison consumption, particularly in light of recent data showing CWD prions in muscle [2]. Human susceptibility to CWD or to other newly emerging animal TSE [9, 14] is still unclear, although we can be somewhat reassured in that there have been no large scale outbreaks of human TSE cases in Colorado and Wyoming, where CWD has existed for decades [51]. Up until approximately 10 years ago, autopsies were not performed on suspect human TSE cases in many states due to biosafety concerns, therefore the diagnosis of potential new TSE strains has been hampered. This indicates that clinical TSE diagnoses in humans were not confirmed, nor was any strain typing done to look for the appearance of potentially subtle or unusual pathological or biochemical phenotypes of a new TSE strain. Fortunately, the autopsy rate for suspect cases is improving. At the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center at Case Western Reserve University (Cleveland, Ohio), Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) suspect cases are studied and classified by CJD subtype. Thus far,
*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported to the Surveillance Center***,
however there have been no unusual or novel prion subtypes that might indicate the appearance of a new prion strain [7, 41]. Other indirect studies of human susceptibility to CWD also suggest that the risk is low. In biochemical conversion studies, Raymond et al. [68] showed that the efficiency of CWD to convert recombinant human PrP into amyloid fibrils was low, but similar to that of both BSE and scrapie fibrils to do the same. These results suggest that there is a molecular incompatibility in the conversion of human PrPC by CWD, sheep scrapie, or BSE, and that cross species infections in humans may be rare events. To determine whether common PrPSc strain features may link CWD and CJD, histopathology and the PrPSc biochemical characteristics from deer and elk were compared with that of humans with sporadic CJD (sCJD) cases that are methionine homozygous at codon 129 of the Prnp gene by Xie et al. [96], although strain features including histologic profile, target organs, and glycoform patterns will not necessarily remain the same upon crossing species barriers [6, 5, 8, 57]. The PrPSc form is cleaved by proteinase-K (PK) at different sites depending on the conformation of the protein and may aid determination of whether the PrPSc conformation is similar. By western blot (SDS-PAGE) of elk CWD, the unglycosylated PK-resistant PrPSc migrated at 21 kDa, similar to sCJD (MM1 subtype) and the PK cleavage site was the same, occurring at residues 78 and 82 as assessed by N-terminal sequencing. Conformational stability was evaluated by measuring the PrPSc stability under partially denaturing conditions and also showed no significant difference between elk CWD and sCJD MM1 PrPSc. However, elk CWD and human sCJD MM1 strains exhibited distinct glycoform patterns by two dimensional gel electrophoresis, suggesting that the strains differed. Future studies may utilize luminescent conjugated polymers, which were recently shown to distinguish naturally- and experimentally-derived prion strains [79]. To study elk-human prion species barriers, Kong et al. inoculated elk CWD into transgenic mice expressing either human PrP or elk PrP. Whereas the elk PrP expressing mice developed disease after only 118-142 days post-inoculation, human PrP expressing mice (129M) did not develop any features of TSE after more than 657 or more than 756 days [41]. In accordance with these results, Tamgüney et al. also reported that human PrP overexpressing mice were not susceptible to 9 CWD isolates from mule deer, white-tailed deer, and elk [84]. However, mice have a limited lifespan and further passages may be necessary to detect low levels of prion infectivity that may be present subclinically. Although indirect evidence is accumulating that there may be a robust species barrier for CWD transmission to humans, one report indicates nonhuman primate susceptibility to CWD. Intracerebral inoculation of squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) demonstrated a positive CWD transmission [49]. Among non-human primates, however, the Prnp sequence of the new world monkeys are the most distant from humans [72], and therefore may not indicate that human prion conversion would occur by CWD.
snip...
11. Disease control challenges posed by CWD
Evidence is building that indicates efficient horizontal transmission occurs in CWD, indeed a complicating aspect in disease control [91]. Potential transmission mechanisms range from spread via direct contact among animals to environmental exposure through grazing in areas contaminated by prion-infected secretions, excretions (saliva, urine, feces), tissues (placenta), or decomposed carcasses. Recently, in a breakthrough finding, saliva from CWD infected deer was shown to transmit prion disease [50]. An additional experiment by Miller and colleagues showed that CWD-infected carcasses allowed to decay naturally in confined pastures can lead to CWD infections in captive deer, demonstrating the potential for environmental contamination to spread infection [55]. Modelling studies have provided further support that environmental contamination is likely playing a significant role in transmitting CWD [56, 53]. Additionally, infectious prions have been demonstrated to bind soil particles and remain infectious to animals by both intracerebral and oral exposure routes [38, 37]. Prion infectivity has been recovered from soil more than two years after experimental exposure to prions, suggesting the soil may serve as a reservoir for CWD prions [75]. Taken together, these results indicate that there may even be multiple sources for CWD exposure, perhaps through direct contact and environmental routes. Significant challenges to CWD eradication exist in free-ranging cervids. Infected deer and elk range over a broad geographic region, and even previously surmised geographic barriers such as the Continental Divide have proven passable by infected animals. Ridding the environment of CWD-contaminated soil or even CWD-infected carcasses is not possible. Moreover, the available ante-mortem diagnostic tests for surveillance are laborious and impractical for large numbers of free-ranging animals [74, 88, 95]. Therefore for a wildlife manager, this disease is costly to survey and difficult to control.
12. Conclusion
CWD in cervids is efficiently transmitted, likely more than any other TSE in animals or humans. Therefore, it is unlikely that this TSE can be eradicated, but perhaps through an improved understanding of transmission routes, biological factors influencing pathogenesis, and the molecular basis of CWD prion conversion, a targeted strategy for interrupting disease spread may be developed.
Acknowledgements
I thank Drs. Michael Miller, Jason Bartz and Mathias Heikenwalder for critical review of the manuscript.
snip...see full text 19 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v08092.pdf
SEE FULL TEXT CWD ;
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/04/prion-disease-of-cervids-chronic.html
Thursday, April 03, 2008
A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/04/prion-disease-of-cervids-chronic.html
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. [flounder@wt.net] Sent: Tuesday, July 29, 2003 1:03 PM To: fdadockets@oc.fda.gov Cc: ggraber@cvm.fda.gov; Linda.Grassie@fda.gov; BSE-L Subject: Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION TO DOCKET 2003N-0312]
For the USA to continue to _flounder_ with these TSEs, as they have done for the past 30 years or so, will only allow the agent to spread. to continue to ignore what every other Country around the globe has dealt with and is still dealing with, and to think that the USA is any different, should be taken with great suspicion $
PLUS, if the USA continues to flagrantly ignore the _documented_ science to date about the known TSEs in the USA (let alone the undocumented TSEs in cattle), it is my opinion, every other Country that is dealing with BSE/TSE should boycott the USA and demand that the SSC reclassify the USA BSE GBR II risk assessment to BSE/TSE GBR III 'IMMEDIATELY'. for the SSC to _flounder_ any longer on this issue, should also be regarded with great suspicion as well. NOT to leave out the OIE and it's terribly flawed system of disease surveillance. the OIE should make a move on CWD in the USA, and make a risk assessment on this as a threat to human health. the OIE should also change the mathematical formula for testing of disease. this (in my opinion and others) is terribly flawed as well. to think that a sample survey of 400 or so cattle in a population of 100 million, to think this will find anything, especially after seeing how many TSE tests it took Italy and other Countries to find 1 case of BSE (1 million rapid TSE test in less than 2 years, to find 102 BSE cases), should be proof enough to make drastic changes of this system. the OIE criteria for BSE Country classification and it's interpretation is very problematic. a text that is suppose to give guidelines, but is not understandable, cannot be considered satisfactory. the OIE told me 2 years ago that they were concerned with CWD, but said any changes might take years. well, two years have come and gone, and no change in relations with CWD as a human health risk. if we wait for politics and science to finally make this connection, we very well may die before any decisions or changes are made. this is not acceptable. we must take the politics and the industry out of any final decisions of the Scientific community. this has been the problem from day one with this environmental man made death sentence. some of you may think i am exaggerating, but you only have to see it once, you only have to watch a loved one die from this one time, and you will never forget, OR forgive...yes, i am still very angry...but the transmission studies DO NOT lie, only the politicians and the industry do...and they are still lying to this day...
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt
From: TSS () Subject: OIE WEAKENS BSE GUIDELINES EVEN MORE FOR TRADE PURPOSES, putting humans further 'at risk' globally Date: May 24, 2006 at 7:17 pm PST
Intl Decision On BSE Standards Seen Helping US Trade Case
WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--The U.S. will now have a much stronger case to make that there is virtually no mad-cow disease risk here thanks to a decision Wednesday by the Paris-based World Organization for Animal Health to relax country standard requirements. Previously, a country had to wait seven years after its discovery of mad-cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy, before it could be considered in the "negligible risk" category -- the category for countries with the least BSE risk.
That has now been changed and countries must wait until 11 years after birth date of the last native-born cow discovered with the disease. The U.S. reported finding its latest BSE case in March, but U.S. Department of Agriculture officials say the infected cow was more than 10 years old when it died.
Under the previous guidelines of the World Organization for Animal Health, known commonly as OIE, the U.S. would have had to wait until 2013 before it could be recognized as a "negligible risk" country. Under the new guidelines, approved Wednesday by unanimous vote, there will be little or no waiting. "For the U.S., this is much better," said Alex Thiermann, an OIE chairman.
He also called the new age-based guideline more "realistic." Ron DeHaven, head of USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service, called the new guidelines "a significant change," in a telephone interview with Dow Jones Newswires, prior to the OIE vote. DeHaven who is currently in Paris for the OIE annual meeting, said, "When we found the (BSE) case is not nearly as relevant as when that animal was born."
Michael David, head of USDA's National Center for Import and Export, agreed and explained that an infected cow's age can point to when there was a spread of the disease. There are three OIE risk categories: "negligible," "controlled" and "undetermined." The U.S. would prefer to be considered "negligible" because it provides negotiators with a stronger case for countries to reopen borders to U.S. beef. A "negligible" standing also carries with it fewer costly safety restrictions than the other categories.
The U.S. has reported finding three cases of BSE in cattle -- one in December 2003, a second in June 2005 and a third in March 2006. However, USDA officials said only the two latest cases count under the new OIE guidelines. The first BSE case, officials said, was in an animal about 6 years old, but that animal was born and infected in Canada before being sent to the U.S. David said that first BSE discovery "was an imported case and it really doesn't matter because we can show that it came from Canada.
The two that mattered to us are two native cases and one was born 12 years ago ... and the second one is at least 10 years old." Despite the infected animal's origin, the December 2003 BSE discovery was and still is very important to many beef-importing nations. Most importing countries, including Japan, South Korea and China, shut their borders to U.S. beef in December 2003.
Japan has since eased its ban and then reinstated it, but even when the country resumes importing again it will maintain restrictions on U.S. beef that are far stricter than OIE guidelines. The USDA's David said Japan registered an official objection with the OIE on the BSE standard changes approved Wednesday, but the country did not vote against them.
China and the U.S. are in negotiations now to resume beef trade, but China's refusal to accept USDA claims that it is a "negligible risk" country complicated talks held in mid-May. USDA officials now have a much stronger argument that U.S. beef products are among the least risky for BSE in the world, but an official OIE confirmation of "negligible" status for the U.S. could be as much as two years away, David said. The process is long and complex, requiring well detailed explanations of such things as a country's BSE surveillance program.
-By Bill Tomson; Dow Jones Newswires; 202-646-0088; bill.tomson@dowjones.com
http://www.cattlenetwork.com/content.asp?contentid=39753
Bse Oie Chapter 2.3.13
##################### Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy #####################
C H A P T E R 2 . 3 . 1 3 .
BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY
Article 2.3.13.1.
The recommendations in this Chapter are intended to manage the human and animal health risks associated with the presence of the bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) agent in cattle (Bos taurus and B. indicus) only.
1) When authorising import or transit of the following commodities and any products made from these commodities and containing no other tissues from cattle, Veterinary Administrations should not require any BSE related conditions, regardless of the BSE risk status of the cattle population of the exporting country, zone or compartment:
snip...
2005 OIE Terrestrial Animal Health Code
http://www.oie.int/downld/SC/2005/bse_2005.pdf
EFSA Scientific Report on the Assessment of the Geographical BSE-Risk (GBR) of the United States of America (USA) Publication date: 20 August 2004 Adopted July 2004 (Question N° EFSA-Q-2003-083)
Report
Summary Summary of the Scientific Report
The European Food Safety Authority and its Scientific Expert Working Group on the Assessment of the Geographical Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Risk (GBR) were asked by the European Commission (EC) to provide an up-to-date scientific report on the GBR in the United States of America, i.e. the likelihood of the presence of one or more cattle being infected with BSE, pre-clinically as well as clinically, in USA. This scientific report addresses the GBR of USA as assessed in 2004 based on data covering the period 1980-2003.
The BSE agent was probably imported into USA and could have reached domestic cattle in the middle of the eighties. These cattle imported in the mid eighties could have been rendered in the late eighties and therefore led to an internal challenge in the early nineties. It is possible that imported meat and bone meal (MBM) into the USA reached domestic cattle and leads to an internal challenge in the early nineties.
A processing risk developed in the late 80s/early 90s when cattle imports from BSE risk countries were slaughtered or died and were processed (partly) into feed, together with some imports of MBM. This risk continued to exist, and grew significantly in the mid 90's when domestic cattle, infected by imported MBM, reached processing. Given the low stability of the system, the risk increased over the years with continued imports of cattle and MBM from BSE risk countries.
EFSA concludes that the current GBR level of USA is III, i.e. it is likely but not confirmed that domestic cattle are (clinically or pre-clinically) infected with the BSE-agent. As long as there are no significant changes in rendering or feeding, the stability remains extremely/very unstable. Thus, the probability of cattle to be (pre-clinically or clinically) infected with the BSE-agent persistently increases.
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/573_en.html
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573/sr03_biohaz02_usa_
report_summary_en1.pdf
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/tse_assessments/gbr_assessments/573/sr03_biohaz02_usa_
report_v2_en1.pdf
CANADA
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_annexes
/563/sr02_biohaz02_canada_report_annex_en1.pdf
MEXICO
http://www.efsa.eu.int/science/efsa_scientific_reports/gbr_assessments/scr_annexes
/566/sr04_biohaz02_mexico_report_annex_en1.pdf
What GAO Found United States Government Accountability Office Why GAO Did This Study Highlights Accountability Integrity Reliability
www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-101.
To view the full product, including the scope and methodology, click on the link above. For more information, contact Robert A. Robinson at (202) 512-3841 or robinsonr@gao.gov. Highlights of GAO-05-101, a report to congressional requesters February 2005 MAD COW DISEASE FDA's Management of the Feed Ban Has Improved, but Oversight Weaknesses Continue to Limit Program Effectiveness
FDA has made needed improvements to its management and oversight of the feed-ban rule in response to GAO's 2002 report, but program weaknesses continue to limit the effectiveness of the ban and place U.S. cattle at risk of spreading BSE. Improvements made include FDA establishing a uniform method of conducting compliance inspections and training FDA inspectors, as well as state inspectors who carry out inspections under agreements with FDA, on the new method. FDA also implemented new data-entry procedures that are designed to more reliably track feed-ban inspection results. Consequently, FDA has a better management tool for overseeing compliance with the feed-ban rule and a data system that better conforms to standard database management practices. However, various program weaknesses continue to undermine the nation's firewall against BSE. For example: . FDA acknowledges that there are more feed manufacturers and transporters, on-farm mixers, and other feed industry businesses that are subject to the feed ban than the approximately 14,800 firms inspected to date; however, it has no uniform approach for identifying additional firms. . FDA has not reinspected approximately 2,800, or about 19 percent, of those businesses, in 5 or more years; several hundred are potentially high risk. FDA does not know whether those businesses now use prohibited material in their feed. . FDA's feed-ban inspection guidance does not include instructions to routinely sample cattle feed to test for potentially prohibited material as part of the compliance inspection. Instead, it includes guidance for inspectors to visually examine facilities and equipment and review invoices and other documents. . Feed intended for export is not required to carry a caution label "Do not feed to cattle or other ruminants," when the label would be required if the feed were sold domestically. Without that statement, feed containing prohibited material could be inadvertently or intentionally diverted back to U.S. cattle or given to foreign cattle. . FDA has not always alerted USDA and states when it learned that cattle may have been given feed that contained prohibited material. This lapse has been occurring even though FDA's guidance calls for such communication. . Although research suggests that cattle can get BSE from ingesting even a small amount of infected material, inspectors do not routinely inspect or review cleanout procedures for vehicles used to haul cattle feed. More than 5 million cattle across Europe have been killed to stop the spread of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), commonly called mad cow disease. Found in 26 countries, including Canada and the United States, BSE is believed to spread through animal feed that contains protein from BSE-infected animals. Consuming meat from infected cattle has also been linked to the deaths of about 150 people worldwide. In 1997, the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) issued a feed-ban rule prohibiting certain animal protein (prohibited material) in feed for cattle and other ruminant animals. FDA and 38 states inspect firms in the feed industry to enforce this critical firewall against BSE. In 2002, GAO reported a number of weaknesses in FDA's enforcement of the feed ban and recommended corrective actions. This report looks at FDA's efforts since 2002 to ensure industry compliance with the feed ban and protect U.S. cattle. What GAO Recommends GAO recommends FDA, among other things, develop procedures for finding additional firms subject to the feed-ban and using tests to augment inspections. FDA said the study was thorough but disagreed on four of nine recommendations. GAO continues to believe that, given the discovery of BSE in North America and the oversight gaps described in the report, the recommended actions are needed to protect U.S. cattle from BSE.
3. Mad Cow Disease: FDA's Management of the Feed Ban Has Improved, but Oversight Weaknesses Continue to Limit Program Effectiveness. GAO-05-101, Feb. 25.
http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-05-101
Highlights -
http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d05101high.pdf
Docket No. 2003N-0312 Animal Feed Safety System [TSS SUBMISSION]
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dockets/03n0312/03N-0312_emc-000001.txt
Docket Management Docket: 02N-0273 - Substances Prohibited From Use in
Animal Food or Feed; Animal Proteins Prohibited in Ruminant Feed
Comment Number: EC -10
Accepted - Volume 2
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be07.html
PART 2
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/dailys/03/Jan03/012403/8004be09.html
Subject: TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES in the USA and OIE reporting of it ??? Date: April 14, 2007 at 12:19 pm PST
----- Original Message -----
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. To: wahis_devt@oie.int Cc: m.zampaglione@oie.int ; oie@oie.int ; rma-mrr@tbs-sct.gc.ca ; B.Vallat@oie.int
Sent: Saturday, April 14, 2007 2:31 PM
Subject: TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES in the USA and OIE reporting of it ???
Greetings again OIE,
I am deeply concerned that the OIE has completely given up on the surveillance and eradication of TSE around the Globe. I am disappointed, and IF the OIE gives favorable ratings for the USA TSE rating with the new BSE/BASE MRR policy, I will then have lost all confidence of this organization as a regulatory authority on animal disease, and consider it nothing more than a National Trading Brokerage for all strains of animal TSE, just to satisfy there commodity. AS i said before, OIE should hang up there jock strap now, since it appears they will buckle every time a country makes some political hay about trade protocol, commodities and futures. IF they are not going to be science based, they should do everyone a favor and dissolve there organization. ...
1st and foremost question,
IF THE OIE gives favorable ratings for USA BSE/BASE/TSE, by what means will it be justified (scientific, not political) ??? ;
Sent: Sunday, January 28, 2007 9:12 PM Subject: BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 COMMENT SUBMISSION
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
snip...
THE USA is in a most unique situation, one of unknown circumstances with human and animal TSE. THE USA has the most documented TSE in different species to date, with substrains growing in those species (BSE/BASE in cattle and CWD in deer and elk, there is evidence here with different strains), and we know that sheep scrapie has over 20 strains of the typical scrapie with atypical scrapie documented and also BSE is very likely to have passed to sheep. all of which have been rendered and fed back to animals for human and animal consumption, a frightening scenario. WE do not know the outcome, and to play with human life around the globe with the very likely TSE tainted products from the USA, in my opinion is like playing Russian roulette, of long duration, with potential long and enduring consequences, of which once done, cannot be undone. These are the facts as I have come to know through daily and extensive research of TSE over 9 years, since 12/14/97. I do not pretend to have all the answers, but i do know to continue to believe in the ukbsenvcjd only theory of transmission to humans of only this one strain from only this one TSE from only this one part of the globe, will only lead to further failures, and needless exposure to humans from all strains of TSE, and possibly many more needless deaths from TSE via a multitude of proven routes and sources via many studies with primates and rodents and other species.
MY personal belief, since you ask, is that not only the Canadian border, but the USA border, and the Mexican border should be sealed up tighter than a drum for exporting there TSE tainted products, until a validated, 100% sensitive test is available, and all animals for human and animal consumption are tested. all we are doing is the exact same thing the UK did with there mad cow poisoning when they exported it all over the globe, all the while knowing what they were doing. this BSE MRR policy is nothing more than a legal tool to do just exactly what the UK did, thanks to the OIE and GW, it's legal now. and they executed Saddam for poisoning ???
go figure. ...
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Comment Submitted Comment Receipt
Thank you. Your comment on Document ID: APHIS-2006-0041-0001 has been sent. Comment Tracking Number: APHIS-2006-0041-DRAFT-0028
Attachments: C:\My Music\My Documents\APHIS-2006-0041_January 28.doc
If you wish to retain a copy of the receipt, use the following link to print a copy for your files.
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main
SEE FULL TEXT OF MY SUBMISSION TO FEDERAL DOCKETS HERE ;
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0701&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=3854
2nd question to OIE,
WHY HAS OIE FAILED TO REPORT THE NOR98 CASE DOCUMENTED IN THE USA ???
NOR98-LIKE STRAIN OF SCRAPIE FOUND IN WYOMING (1791 lines) From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <[log in to unmask]> Date: Wed, 11 Apr 2007 15:08:15 -0500
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0704&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=8315
AND, what about the DECLARATION OF EXTRAORDINARY EMERGENCY DUE TO ATYPICAL TSE IN THOSE MAD SHEEP OF MAD RIVER VALLEY ???
FOIA REQUEST FOR ATYPICAL TSE INFORMATION ON VERMONT SHEEP Re: FOIA REQUEST FOR ATYPICAL TSE INFORMATION ON VERMONT SHEEP (4843 lines) From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <[log in to unmask]> Date: Mon, 2 Apr 2007 14:43:32 -0500
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0704&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=816
3RD question to OIE
WHY HAS OIE FAILED ON THERE PROMISE TO BRING THE REAL POTENTIAL FOR CWD RISK FACTORS TOWARD TRANSMISSION TO HUMANS TO THE ATTENTION OF THE PUBLIC AROUND THE GLOBE ???
Subject: Re: CWD AMERICA ???
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2002 19:10:18 +0200
From: "INFORMATION DEPT" Organization: O.I.E
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
References: <3d2f0169.3@wt.net> <012901c229b2$ad43bb90$7f00000a@hpkb> <3d2f2358.5010700@wt.net>
I agree with you Dr Terry. The OIE, namely the International Animal Health Code Commission is working on making proposals to Member Countries to change the OIE lists so to avoid some the problems mentioned in you e-mail. This will take at least two years before adoption by the International Committee. For BSE, countries asked the OIE to post information on BSE on the OIE web site.
Personally, I am interested in Chronic Wasting Disease and I follow what is distributed through ProMed. Delegates of OIE Member Countries can propose diseases to be added to the list.
Kind regards.
Karim Ben Jebara
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: "INFORMATION DEPT"
Sent: Friday, July 12, 2002 8:43 PM
Subject: Re: CWD AMERICA ???
hello Dr. Jebara,
many thanks for your swift and kind reply.
if i am not mistaken, it was the same email address. it was 3 or 4 weeks ago i wrote, as it is, i don't save 'sent' emails anymore, unless very important.
my main concern (besides the fact that a potential TSE has been in the USA cattle for some time, but the APHIS do not test to find), is that the CWD could very well be transmitting to humans, and i just did not see to much posted about it on OIE site.
Coming back to your question, Chronic Wasting Disease is not an OIE
listed disease. Please see OIE disease lists at
http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/en_classification.htm#ListeA).
why is this TSE (CWD) not listed and followed as with BSE ?
Article 1.1.3.2. 1. Countries shall make available to other countries, through the OIE, whatever information is necessary to minimise the spread of important animal diseases and to assist in achieving better worldwide control of these diseases.
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/MCode/A_00005.htm
The USA CWD is an important animal disease.
why is it not followed?
The decision to add or delete a disease from the OIE lists, come
through proposals made by Member Countries and it has to be adopted by
the International Committee.
i _urgently_ suggest a proposal to the OIE to follow this disease very closely, and to propose _more_ testing in the USA for TSEs in the USA cattle...
kindest regards, terry
INFORMATION DEPT wrote:
Dear Sir,
This is the first time that I receive your e-mail. To whom have you written in the OIE or to which address?
Coming back to your question, Chronic Wasting Disease is not an OIE listed disease. Please see OIE disease lists at http://www.oie.int/eng/maladies/en_classification.htm#ListeA).
Countries should report to the OIE any disease even is not listed in the OIE's lists in some conditions (example: an exceptional epidemiological event). Please read Chapter 1.1.3 of the International animal health code to have more information on disease notification and epidemiological information agreed by OIE Member Countries at :
http://www.oie.int/eng/normes/MCode/A_00005.htm
The decision to add or delete a disease from the OIE lists, come through proposals made by Member Countries and it has to be adopted by the International Committee.
Hope that I answered to your question.
Best regards.
Dr Karim Ben Jebara Head Animal Health Information Department OIE
----- Original Message -----
From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."
To: Sent: Friday, July 12, 2002 6:18 PM
Subject: CWD AMERICA ???
I WROTE TO OIE RECENTLY ASKING 'WHY OIE DOES NOT FOLLOW CWD IN AMERICA' ? with no reply ? i am still seeking an answer ?
many thanks, and kind regards, terry =====================
SNIP...END
OIE needs to seriously consider making CWD (all strains) a Zoonotic Disease sooner, rather than later, after the fact, when millions have already become exposed.
why you ask, because CWD transmits to primates, as with BSE, and maybe humans as GSS ???
Re: Colorado Surveillance Program for Chronic Wasting Disease Transmission to Humans (TWO SUSPECT CASES) (8150 lines) From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <[log in to unmask]> Date: Wed, 4 Apr 2007 16:22:22 -0500
FURTHER into this case study, Colorado Surveillance Program for Chronic Wasting Disease Transmission to Humans (TWO SUSPECT CASES) a look at case 1 and case 2 ;
CASE 1
A 52-year-old right-handed woman presented with a 1-year history of progressive memory loss, language impairment, visuospatial disturbance, and myoclonus. She related that she had been a histology technician in a laboratory that processed tissue specimens from deer and elk with CWD and had handled specimens without wearing gloves. Both she and her family expressed significant concerns about the possibility of transdermal transmission of CWD. Her family history was negative for dementia and other neurologic disorders. Brain magnetic resonance imaging showed mild diffuse volume loss, and electroencephalography demonstrated mild diffuse slowing. Other laboratory studies were unremarkable. Cerebrospinal fluid findings were unremarkable except for a weakly immunostaining 14-3-3 protein band, an indeterminate finding for the diagnosis of prion disease. Genetic testing of the prion protein gene was normal, revealing methionine homozygosity at codon 129. Brain biopsy results were negative for the presence of proteaseresistant prion protein but showed definite Alzheimer disease with numerous neuritic plaques and tau-positive neurofibrillary tangles (Figure). Further analysis of brain tissue at the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center was negative for prion disease by Western blot analysis. Subsequent investigation by the state department of health revealed the patient had worked in an area of the laboratory that conducted necropsies on domestic animals and had never been assigned to the CWD testing laboratory. The Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment could not confirm that the technician had ever worked with deer and elk tissues.
CASE 2
This 25-year-old right-handed man had a 4-month history of progressive gait disturbance, myoclonus, hallucinations, slowed cognition, impaired attention, and memory loss. He had hunted deer and elk in a CWD endemic area of southern Wyoming and cooked and ate the field-dressed meat. His family history was significant in that his mother had died of a dementing disease at age 40 years, although there was neither a clinical diagnosis nor an autopsy. Brain magnetic resonance imaging findings were unremarkable, and electroencephalography demonstrated 1-Hz high-amplitude periodic sharp wave complexes. Other laboratory studies had negative results. Testing for the 14-3-3 protein had positive results, but the cerebrospinal fluid was otherwise unremarkable. The diagnosis of Gerstmann-Stra¨ussler-Scheinker syndrome, a familial prion disease, was confirmed with a detailed autopsy examination and referral of the brain to the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center. Autopsy brain tissue showed the presence of proteaseresistant prion protein by Western blot analysis. Genetic evaluation revealed the P102L mutation in the prion protein gene with methionine/valine heterozygosity at codon 129.
snip...end
I can't understand how they can keep claiming 'low, or no occupational transmission of CJD' ??? when there have been many cases that should have raised awareness, and in some cases they did, only to be swept under the rug as the infamous sporadic CJD, or some other TSE other than the nvCJD of the ukbsenvcjd only theory. it's a blown theory no one will accept too. lets look at a few occupational cases. ...TSS
now, some things to ponder ;
Questions:
1. Do neuritic plaques and tau-positive neurofibrillary tangles indicate definite AD? Aren't these also found in GSS? What about concurrent AD and TSE?
2. Are the NPDPSC results conclusive? Do WB results depend on the part of the brain sampled?
3. Doesn't it seem unlikely the woman would flat-out lie about working with CWD tissues? (I'm working on this locally.)
4. What about cross-contamination? The lab gets large numbers of scrapie-infected sheep and CWD-infected deer and elk. I assume the necropsy area is contaminated with TSEs.
snip...
Results Neuropathological and genetic assessment in the 2 patients proved the
diagnoses of early-onset Alzheimer disease and a rare genetic prion disease
very interesting, and something to ponder here for sure ;
AS implied in the Inset 25 we must not _ASSUME_ that transmission of BSE to other species will invariably present pathology typical of a scrapie-like disease.
snip...
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/yb/1991/01/04004001.pdf
and i think this would apply to CWD to humans as well.
rare genetic prion disease
would be interesting to know the exact genetic TSE they are speaking of. GSS, FFI, Familial/Genetic CJD, and or the sporadic FFI that is not genetic, and don't ask me why ??? does not make sense to me either. it's either genetic or not. like i have said many times, the diagnostic criteria differentiating the different human and animal TSE is missing something. but if you have a strain of genetic/familial TSE i.e. FFI, and then you classify a sub-type of that strain that use to be gentic to sporadic, then you have either gone back to sCJD, or the complete damn diagnostic criteria is wrong. you just have well named the damn thing ;
Parchi-Capellari-Chin-Schwarz-Schecter-Butts-Hudkins-Burns-Powers-Gambetti-D ISEASE.
TSS
Subject: Alzheimer-type neuropathology in a 28-year old patient with iatrogenic CJD after dural grafting Date: March 9, 2007 at 9:15 am PST
HUMAN-04
snip...full text ;
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0704&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=1165
IN my opinion the WOAH/OIE is nothing more than a organized bunch of lobbyist for the members Countries in support of there INDUSTRY, bound together as one, with the only purpose of open trade for there precious commodities and futures. Speaking only of BSE, they failed at every corner, and then just said to hell with it, well just trade all strains of TSE globally.
snip...
NOW, ask yourself why not one single mad cow has been documented in the USA since the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG did the end around Johanns, Dehaven et al ??? found two atypical BSE or BASE cases and they flat shut it down i tell you. IF the OIE gives a favorable rating, IF the OIE gives any other rating but the lowest, poorest possible BSE/TSE rating, the OIE will have sealed there fate once and for all, because most of the world knows the truth about the USA and there mad cows. THE OIE will then be able to stand side by side with the USA, and proudly claim to have sold there soul to the devil, all for a buck, commodities and futures, to hell with human health. A 'CONTROLLED' RATING IS EXACTLY what the OIE will get if that is what they classify the USA as a 'CONTROLLED RATING'. IT will be controlled by Johanns, Dehaven, and GW. IT WILL BE RIGGED in other words. but that is nothing new, it's been rigged for years. ...
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&D=0&P=498
Re: REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE NINTH CASE OF BSE IN CANADA UPDATE MARCH 26, 2007 (921 lines)
From: Terry S. Singeltary Sr. <[log in to unmask]>
Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2007 15:48:11 -0600
Date: Tue, 10 Apr 2007 12:54:12 -0500 Reply-To: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group <[log in to unmask]> Sender: Sustainable Agriculture Network Discussion Group <[log in to unmask]> From: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr." <[log in to unmask]> Subject: Re: Birth cohort of CANADIAN BSE-positive animal was exported to the United States Content-type: multipart/alternative;
Subject: Re: Birth cohort of CANADIAN BSE-positive animal was exported to the United States Date: April 10, 2007 at 10:33 am PST
"It most likely" entered the food supply "given that it was slaughtered," said Karen Eggert, a spokeswoman with USDA's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service.
"But it wouldn't have gone to slaughter if it was showing any clinical signs for BSE. We're not looking at this as a possibility that a BSE infected cow got into the United States," she said.
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN1040765520070410
how in the heck does she know ??? does she know what sub-clinical means ???
snip...full text ;
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0704&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=7609
23.2 BSE-infected mad cows in the standing Canadian adult cattle population. very disturbing...
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/downloads/BSE_Prevalence.pdf
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&D=0&P=15653
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0701&L=sanet-mg&D=0&P=3854
NOW, FINAL QUESTION TO OIE, HOW CAN OIE JUSTIFY GIVING USA A FAVORABLE RATING ON BSE/BASE/TSE MRR POLICY WHEN THE USA HAS THE MOST DOCUMENTED TRANSMISSIBLE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHIES IN MORE SPECIES THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY, ALL OF WHICH HAS BEEN RENDERED AND FED BACK TO ANIMALS (CATTLE INCLUDED) FOR HUMAN AND ANIMAL CONSUMPTION, AND ALSO HAS THE MOST DOCUMENTED ATTEMPTS AT COVERING UP MAD COW DISEASES IN THE USA, ALSO, MORE BLATANTLY AND HAPHAZARDLY THAN ANY OTHER COUNTRY IN THE WORLD, HOW CAN ONE JUSTIFY A FAVORABLE MAD COW RATING WITH ALL THIS $$$
THE ONLY BSE MRR RATING THE USA AND ALL OF NORTH AMERICA SHOULD GET IS A TERRIBLY FAILED RATING, SCIENTIFICALLY SPEAKING, THIS IS THE ONLY RATING POSSIBLE. ANY OTHER RATING WILL PROVE THE OIE IS NOTHING MORE THAN A FAILED AUTHORITY ON HUMAN/ANIMAL DISEASE, AND THEIR MOTO OF ''Protecting the world from emerging diseases linked to globalisation'' will read more like ''PROTECTING OUR COMMODITIES AND FUTURES FROM DEAD CONSUMERS FAMILIES LINKED TO EMERGING POLITICS''
I am still sincerely disgusted,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Re: O.I.E. SELLS THERE SOUL TO THE DEVIL AND WILL REPEAT WHAT THE U.K. DID, POISON THE WORLD LEGALLY WITH MAD COW DISEASEs
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&P=498
Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME
http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
Interference at the EPA - Science and Politics at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
please see full text ;
http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/
Saturday, June 7, 2008
Export Requirements for the Republic of Korea IMPORT HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. BEEF AND BEEF PRODUCTS
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/export-requirements-for-republic-of.html
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Statement May 4, 2004 Media Inquiries: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
Statement on Texas Cow With Central Nervous System Symptoms On Friday, April 30 th , the Food and Drug Administration learned that a cow with central nervous system symptoms had been killed and shipped to a processor for rendering into animal protein for use in animal feed.
FDA, which is responsible for the safety of animal feed, immediately began an investigation. On Friday and throughout the weekend, FDA investigators inspected the slaughterhouse, the rendering facility, the farm where the animal came from, and the processor that initially received the cow from the slaughterhouse.
FDA's investigation showed that the animal in question had already been rendered into "meat and bone meal" (a type of protein animal feed). Over the weekend FDA was able to track down all the implicated material. That material is being held by the firm, which is cooperating fully with FDA.
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2004/NEW01061.html
Owner and Corporation Plead Guilty to Defrauding Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program
An Arizona meat processing company and its owner pled guilty in February 2007 to charges of theft of Government funds, mail fraud, and wire fraud. The owner and his company defrauded the BSE Surveillance Program when they falsified BSE Surveillance Data Collection Forms and then submitted payment requests to USDA for the services. In addition to the targeted sample population (those cattle that were more than 30 months old or had other risk factors for BSE), the owner submitted to USDA, or caused to be submitted, BSE obex (brain stem) samples from healthy USDA-inspected cattle. As a result, the owner fraudulently received approximately $390,000. Sentencing is scheduled for May 2007.
snip...
Topics that will be covered in ongoing or planned reviews under Goal 1 include:
soundness of BSE maintenance sampling (APHIS),
implementation of Performance-Based Inspection System enhancements for specified risk material (SRM) violations and improved inspection controls over SRMs (FSIS and APHIS),
snip...
The findings and recommendations from these efforts will be covered in future semiannual reports as the relevant audits and investigations are completed.
4 USDA OIG SEMIANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS FY 2007 1st Half
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/sarc070619.pdf
-------- Original Message --------
Subject: Re: BSE 'INCONCLUSIVE' COW from TEXAS ???
Date: Fri, 19 Nov 2004 11:38:21 -0600
From: Carla Everett
To: "Terry S. Singeltary Sr."References: <[log in to unmask]>
The USDA has made a statement, and we are referring all callers to the USDA web site. We have no information about the animal being in Texas.
Carla
At 09:44 AM ***11/19/2004***, you wrote:
Greetings Carla,
i am getting unsubstantiated claims of this BSE 'inconclusive' cow is from
TEXAS. can you comment on this either way please?
thank you,
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.>>
***Aug. 30, 2005***
Investigation Results of Texas Cow That Tested Positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
Release No. 0336.05 Contact: USDA Jim Rogers 202-690-4755 FDA Rae Jones 301-827- 6242
Printable version Email this page
U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
Investigation Results of Texas Cow That Tested Positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Aug. 30, 2005
The U.S. Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) and the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services' Food and Drug Administration (FDA) have completed their investigations regarding a cow that tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) in June 2005. The agencies conducted these investigations in collaboration with the Texas Animal Health Commission and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service.
Our results indicate that the positive animal, called the index animal, was born and raised on a ranch (termed the "index farm") in Texas. It was a cream colored Brahma cross approximately 12 years old at the time of its death. It was born prior to the implementation of the 1997 feed ban instituted by FDA to help minimize the risk that a cow might consume feed contaminated with the agent thought to cause BSE. The animal was sold through a livestock sale in November of 2004 and transported to a packing plant. The animal was dead upon arrival at the packing plant and was then shipped to a pet food plant where it was sampled for BSE. The plant did not use the animal in its product, and the carcass was destroyed in November 2004.
snip... see full text ;
http://www.usda.gov/wps/portal/usdahome?contentidonly=true&contentid=2005/08/0336.xml
DeLauro is ranking member of the House Appropriations Agriculture subcommittee, which has jurisdiction and oversight responsibilities of USDA and FDA.
“I am concerned that the APHIS officials that reviewed these results seemed to make decisions based not on science, but on the economic ramifications a positive BSE finding in a domestic born animal could have on the U.S. economy,” said DeLauro. “When consumer safety is in question, APHIS should not be forced into additional testing of an inconclusive sample by its inspector general.
“While we are glad that this cow did not enter the human food supply, APHIS officials had a responsibility to further examine this sample that even our “gold standard” test proved inconclusive. By refusing to send samples for further testing, APHIS could have jeopardized consumer health and safety and put the industry at a disadvantage, drawing into question the safety of our beef.
“Today I am requesting that APHIS disclose which officials made this decision and further explain their reasoning for not voluntarily testing this inconclusive sample further.”
###
www.house.gov/delauro
http://www.house.gov/delauro/press/2006/February/APHIS_retesting_2_3_06.html
48 hr BSE confirmation turnaround took 7+ months to confirm this case, so the BSE MRR policy could be put into place. ...TSS
NOW, all the above announced July 27, 2005. SO, the other 'inconclusive' sample has been sitting on the shelf since April, some 4 months earlier, give or take a few days. NOW, what has been going on while this other inconclusive BSE/BASE mad cow sits on the shelf. Lets look at that BSE MRR COMMODITY time frame ;-)
7/20/05 USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export: Protocol for The Importation of Farm Raised Cervids from Canada PDF USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export: Protocol for The Importation of Camelids from Canada PDF
7/15/05 Importation of Bovines (Cattle or Bison) from Canada for Feeding PDF BSE Minimal-Risk Regions and the Importation of Live Animals Importers, Brokers, and Other Interested Parties PDF BSE Minimal-Risk Regions and the Importation of Live Animals Accredited Veterinarians or Other Interested Parties PDF USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export: Protocol for The Importation of Cattle or Bison for Feeding from Canada PDF USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export: Protocol for the Importation of Cattle, Bison, Sheep and Goats for Immediate Slaughter from Canada PDF USDA, APHIS, Veterinary Services, National Center for Import and Export: Protocol for the Importation of Sheep and Goats for Feeding from Canada PDF Animal Products Implementation: Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions and Importation of Commodities from Canada PDF Johanns Announces Next Steps for Importing Canadian Cattle Transcript of Tele-News Conference with Agriculture Secretary Mike Johanns Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions and Importation of Commodities— FINAL RULE— 9 CFR Parts 93, 94, 95, and 96 [Docket No. 03-080-3] Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy; Minimal-Risk Regions and Importation of Commodities; Partial Delay of Applicability [Docket No. 03-080-6] — Final rule; partial delay of applicability — 9 CFR Parts 94 and 95Published March 11, 2005 — 70 FR 12112-12113 Text PDF • Risk Document PDF • Economic Analysis PDF • Appendices to economic analysis PDF • Final environmental assessment PDF • Final Rule on BSE and Minimal-Risk Regions (Factsheet) • Questions and Answers for Minimal Risk/Canada Rule • Port of Entry for Eligible Ruminants 7/14/05 Secretary Johanns Statement on Ninth Circuit Court Ruling
04/01/05 Canada, Mexico And United States Release Harmonized North American BSE Strategy Harmonization of a BSE Strategy (PDF)
03/17/05 U.S. Government Requests Appeal In Minimal-Risk Rule Case
03/04/05 BSE Minimal-Risk Regions and Importation of Live Animals and Commodities From Canada Delay of Effective Date (Memo)
TEXAS FEED STANDARDS
Report on Food & Drug Administration Dallas District Investigation of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Event in Texas 2005
Executive Summary:
On June 24, 2005, USDA informed FDA that a cow in Texas tested positive for Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE). Information provided by APHIS was that the BSE positive cow was born and raised in a herd in Texas and was approximately 12 years old. The animal was sampled for BSE at a pet food plant in Texas on November 15, 2004, as part of USDA’s enhanced surveillance program. The animal was disposed of by incineration and did not enter the human food or animal feed chains. Although the positive animal posed no risk to the animal feed supply, FDA, APHIS, the Texas Animal Health Commission (TAHC), and the Texas Feed and Fertilizer Control Service (TFFCS) conducted a feed investigation with two main objectives. The first objective was to identify all protein sources in the animal’s feed history that could potentially have been the source of the BSE agent. The second objective was to verify that cattle leaving the herd after 1997 that were identified by USDA/APHIS as animals of concern (e.g. progeny and feed cohorts), were rendered at facilities in compliance with the regulation (21 CFR 589.2000) that prohibits most mammalian protein in feed for ruminants that became effective August 4, 1997 (herein called BSE/Ruminant Feed rule).
snip...
The feed history investigation identified 21 feed products that had been used on the farm since 1990. These feed products were purchased from three retail feed stores and had been manufactured at nine different feed mills. The investigators visited these establishments to collect information on formulations, shipping invoices, and use of ruminant meat and bone meal (MBM) on the premises both pre-1997 feed ban and post-1997 feed ban. This investigation found no feed products used on the farm since 1997 that had been formulated to contain prohibited mammalian protein.
The investigation identified one feed which contained an animal protein source that could not be identified. The investigation also found one feed mill that supplied feed to the farm that had used ruminant MBM in feed formulations for non-ruminant species after the BSE/Ruminant Feed rule went into effect, which is permitted under the rule, and that several feed mills had used ruminant MBM in feeds prior to the feed ban. Although the investigation did not identify a specific feed source as the likely cause of this animal’s infection, it is probable that the most likely route of exposure for this animal was consumption of an animal feed containing mammalian protein prior to the implementation of the BSE/Ruminant Feed rule in 1997.
snip... see full text ;
http://www.fda.gov/cvm/texasfeedrpt.htm
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE P01-05 January 30, 2001 Print Media: 301-827-6242 Consumer Inquiries: 888-INFO-FDA
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Note: On Dec. 23, 2003, the U.S. Department of Agriculture reported that a cow in Washington state had tested positive for bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE, or mad cow disease). As a result, information on this Web page stating that no BSE cases had been found in the United States is now incorrect. However, because other information on this page continues to have value, the page will remain available for viewing.
FDA ANNOUNCES TEST RESULTS FROM TEXAS FEED LOT
Today the Food and Drug Administration announced the results of tests taken on feed used at a Texas feedlot that was suspected of containing meat and bone meal from other domestic cattle -- a violation of FDA's 1997 prohibition on using ruminant material in feed for other ruminants. Results indicate that a very low level of prohibited material was found in the feed fed to cattle.
FDA has determined that each animal could have consumed, at most and in total, five-and-one-half grams - approximately a quarter ounce -- of prohibited material. These animals weigh approximately 600 pounds.
It is important to note that the prohibited material was domestic in origin (therefore not likely to contain infected material because there is no evidence of BSE in U.S. cattle), fed at a very low level, and fed only once. The potential risk of BSE to such cattle is therefore exceedingly low, even if the feed were contaminated.
According to Dr. Bernard Schwetz, FDA's Acting Principal Deputy Commissioner, "The challenge to regulators and industry is to keep this disease out of the United States. One important defense is to prohibit the use of any ruminant animal materials in feed for other ruminant animals. Combined with other steps, like U.S. Department of Agriculture's (USDA) ban on the importation of live ruminant animals from affected countries, these steps represent a series of protections, to keep American cattle free of BSE."
Despite this negligible risk, Purina Mills, Inc., is nonetheless announcing that it is voluntarily purchasing all 1,222 of the animals held in Texas and mistakenly fed the animal feed containing the prohibited material. Therefore, meat from those animals will not enter the human food supply. FDA believes any cattle that did not consume feed containing the prohibited material are unaffected by this incident, and should be handled in the beef supply clearance process as usual.
FDA believes that Purina Mills has behaved responsibly by first reporting the human error that resulted in the misformulation of the animal feed supplement and then by working closely with State and Federal authorities.
This episode indicates that the multi-layered safeguard system put into place is essential for protecting the food supply and that continued vigilance needs to be taken, by all concerned, to ensure these rules are followed routinely.
FDA will continue working with USDA as well as State and local officials to ensure that companies and individuals comply with all laws and regulations designed to protect the U.S. food supply.
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/NEWS/2001/NEW00752.html
ooops, another USDA BSE test protocol breach ;
BESIDES the Texas mad cow that sat on the shelf for 7+ months before the Honorable Phyllis Fong of the OIG finally did the end around Johanns et al and finally had Weybridge bring that negative cow back from the dead to finally being a confirmed mad cow (hint, hint, getting MRR implemented first), was this simply another bumbling of BSE protocol, or just same old same old;
Jim Rogers (202) 690-4755
USDA Press Office (202) 720-4623
Statement by Chief Veterinary Medical Officer John Clifford Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service Regarding Non-Definitive BSE Test ResultsJuly 27, 2005
snip...
Our laboratory ran the IHC test on the sample and received non-definitive results that suggest the need for further testing. As we have previously experienced, it is possible for an IHC test to yield differing results depending on the “slice” of tissue that is tested. Therefore, scientists at our laboratory and at Weybridge will run the IHC test on additional “slices” of tissue from this animal to determine whether or not it was infected with BSE. We will announce results as soon as they are compiled, which we expect to occur by next week.
I would note that the sample was taken in April, at which time the protocols allowed for a preservative to be used (protocols changed in June 2005). The sample was not submitted to us until last week, because the veterinarian set aside the sample after preserving it and simply forgot to send it in. On that point, I would like to emphasize that while that time lag is not optimal, it has no implications in terms of the risk to human health. The carcass of this animal was destroyed, therefore there is absolutely no risk to human or animal health from this animal.
snip...
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/news/2005/07/bsestatement_vs.html
Audit Report
Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) Surveillance Program - Phase II
and
Food Safety and Inspection Service
Controls Over BSE Sampling, Specified Risk Materials, and Advanced Meat Recovery Products - Phase III
Report No. 50601-10-KC January 2006
Finding 2 Inherent Challenges in Identifying and Testing High-Risk Cattle Still Remain
Our prior report identified a number of inherent problems in identifying and testing high-risk cattle. We reported that the challenges in identifying the universe of high-risk cattle, as well as the need to design procedures to obtain an appropriate representation of samples, was critical to the success of the BSE surveillance program. The surveillance program was designed to target nonambulatory cattle, cattle showing signs of CNS disease (including cattle testing negative for rabies), cattle showing signs not inconsistent with BSE, and dead cattle. Although APHIS designed procedures to ensure FSIS condemned cattle were sampled and made a concerted effort for outreach to obtain targeted samples, industry practices not considered in the design of the surveillance program reduced assurance that targeted animals were tested for BSE.
USDA/OIG-A/50601-10-KC Page 27
observe these animals ante mortem when possible to assure the animals from the target population are ultimately sampled and the clinical signs evaluated.
snip...
http://www.usda.gov/oig/webdocs/50601-10-KC.pdf
In this context, a word is in order about the US testing program. After the discovery of the first (imported) cow in 2003, the magnitude of testing was much increased, reaching a level of >400,000 tests in 2005 (Figure 4). Neither of the 2 more recently indigenously infected older animals with nonspecific clinical features would have been detected without such testing, and neither would have been identified as atypical without confirmatory Western blots. Despite these facts, surveillance has now been decimated to 40,000 annual tests (USDA news release no. 0255.06, July 20, 2006) and invites the accusation that the United States will never know the true status of its involvement with BSE.
In short, a great deal of further work will need to be done before the phenotypic features and prevalence of atypical BSE are understood. More than a single strain may have been present from the beginning of the epidemic, but this possibility has been overlooked by virtue of the absence of widespread Western blot confirmatory testing of positive screening test results; or these new phenotypes may be found, at least in part, to result from infections at an older age by a typical BSE agent, rather than neonatal infections with new "strains" of BSE. Neither alternative has yet been investigated.
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol12no12/06-0965.htm
CDC DR. PAUL BROWN TSE EXPERT COMMENTS 2006
The U.S. Department of Agriculture was quick to assure the public earlier this week that the third case of mad cow disease did not pose a risk to them, but what federal officials have not acknowledged is that this latest case indicates the deadly disease has been circulating in U.S. herds for at least a decade.
The second case, which was detected last year in a Texas cow and which USDA officials were reluctant to verify, was approximately 12 years old.
These two cases (the latest was detected in an Alabama cow) present a picture of the disease having been here for 10 years or so, since it is thought that cows usually contract the disease from contaminated feed they consume as calves. The concern is that humans can contract a fatal, incurable, brain-wasting illness from consuming beef products contaminated with the mad cow pathogen.
"The fact the Texas cow showed up fairly clearly implied the existence of other undetected cases," Dr. Paul Brown, former medical director of the National Institutes of Health's Laboratory for Central Nervous System Studies and an expert on mad cow-like diseases, told United Press International. "The question was, 'How many?' and we still can't answer that."
Brown, who is preparing a scientific paper based on the latest two mad cow cases to estimate the maximum number of infected cows that occurred in the United States, said he has "absolutely no confidence in USDA tests before one year ago" because of the agency's reluctance to retest the Texas cow that initially tested positive.
USDA officials finally retested the cow and confirmed it was infected seven months later, but only at the insistence of the agency's inspector general.
"Everything they did on the Texas cow makes everything USDA did before 2005 suspect," Brown said. ...snip...end
http://www.upi.com/
CDC - Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy and Variant Creutzfeldt ... Dr. Paul Brown is Senior Research Scientist in the Laboratory of Central Nervous System ... Address for correspondence: Paul Brown, Building 36, Room 4A-05, ...
http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/eid/vol7no1/brown.htm
PAUL BROWN COMMENT TO ME ON THIS ISSUE
Tuesday, September 12, 2006 11:10 AM
"Actually, Terry, I have been critical of the USDA handling of the mad cow issue for some years, and with Linda Detwiler and others sent lengthy detailed critiques and recommendations to both the USDA and the Canadian Food Agency."
http://lists.ifas.ufl.edu/cgi-bin/wa.exe?A2=ind0703&L=sanet-mg&T=0&P=8125
Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center
An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD
April 3, 2008
The importance to public health in the U.S. of timely diagnosis and monitoring of human prion diseases is unquestionable. Here are some compelling reasons for this:
Prion surveillance in cattle has been reduced by 90% (from about 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in 2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered). Termination of human prion surveillance would therefore remove the second line of surveillance, thereby eliminating prion surveillance in the U.S. entirely. This development would be extremely worrisome in view of recent reports that precautions to limit the spread of the prion infectious agent may not have been followed in some slaughter houses in the U.S. Cattle affected with bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) continue to be discovered in Canada, which has more rigorous BSE surveillance than the U.S. At the same time, Canada imposes few limitations in the trade of potentially prion-infectious cattle with the U.S.
Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.
http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45
National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL) Immunohistochemistry (IHC) Testing Summary
The BSE enhanced surveillance program involves the use of a rapid screening test, followed by confirmatory testing for any samples that come back \"inconclusive.\" The weekly summary below captures all rapid tests conducted as part of the enhanced surveillance effort. It should be noted that since the enhanced surveillance program began, USDA has also conducted approximately 9,200 routine IHC tests on samples that did not first undergo rapid testing. This was done to ensure that samples inappropriate for the rapid screen test were still tested, and also to monitor and improve upon IHC testing protocols. ...
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/lpa/issues/bse_testing/test_results.html
I don\'t believe them anymore, and i am not the only one. ...TSS
IT was said long ago, and they damn well meant it, it\'s been proven now ;
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the \'\'Independent\'\' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_...
snip...
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
Dr. Detwiler tried to tell them in 2003, before she was sent out to pasture by the Bush Administration, but Bush wanted to cover up mad cow disease;
USDA 2003
We have to be careful that we don\'t get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We\'ve gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We\'re using the brain stem and we\'re looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It\'s a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They\'ve recently gone back. Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an \'official\' test result as recognized by APHIS .
Dr. Detwiler: That\'s on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren\'t they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they\'re looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.
snip.............
Dr. Detwiler: It seems a good idea, but I\'m not aware of it. Another important thing to get across to the public is that the negatives do not guarantee absence of infectivity. The animal could be early in the disease and the incubation period. Even sample collection is so important. If you\'re not collecting the right area of the brain in sheep, or if collecting lymphoreticular tissue, and you don\'t get a good biopsy, you could miss the area with the PRP in it and come up with a negative test. There\'s a new, unusual form of Scrapie that\'s been detected in Norway. We have to be careful that we don\'t get so set in the way we do things that we forget to look for different emerging variations of disease. We\'ve gotten away from collecting the whole brain in our systems. We\'re using the brain stem and we\'re looking in only one area. In Norway, they were doing a project and looking at cases of Scrapie, and they found this where they did not find lesions or PRP in the area of the obex. They found it in the cerebellum and the cerebrum. It\'s a good lesson for us. Ames had to go back and change the procedure for looking at Scrapie samples. In the USDA, we had routinely looked at all the sections of the brain, and then we got away from it. They\'ve recently gone back.
Dr. Keller: Tissues are routinely tested, based on which tissue provides an \'official\' test result as recognized by APHIS .
Dr. Detwiler: That\'s on the slaughter. But on the clinical cases, aren\'t they still asking for the brain? But even on the slaughter, they\'re looking only at the brainstem. We may be missing certain things if we confine ourselves to one area.
snip...
FULL TEXT;
Completely Edited Version PRION ROUNDTABLE
Accomplished this day, Wednesday, December 11, 2003, Denver, Colorado
AND THE REST IS HISTORY, BSE MRR, the legal trading of all strains of TSE globally;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8152
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 Date: January 9, 2007 at 9:08 am PST
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f3412
IN A NUT SHELL ;
(Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 23 May 2006)
11. Information published by the OIE is derived from appropriate declarations made by the official Veterinary Services of Member Countries. The OIE is not responsible for inaccurate publication of country disease status based on inaccurate information or changes in epidemiological status or other significant events that were not promptly reported to the Central Bureau,
http://www.oie.int/eng/Session2007/RF2006.pdf
Wednesday, April 16, 2008
REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE ELEVENTH CASE OF BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN CANADA
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/2008/04/report-on-investigation-of-eleventh.html
BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM FROM DOWNER CATTLE UPDATE
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS
http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Texas Legend Ranch OAI 05/10/2008
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/05/fda-bseruminant-feed-inspections-firms.html
Sunday, March 16, 2008
MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
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