Sent: Tuesday, February 09, 2010 4:59 PM
Subject: Kim Min-sun Anti-US Beef Actress Prevails in Court
02-09-2010 19:38
Anti-US Beef Actress Prevails in Court
By Park Si-soo Staff Reporter
Actress Kim Min-sun won a legal battle Tuesday, started by an American beef importer for an article she wrote two years ago on her private blog that allegedly exaggerated the risk of mad cow disease associated with U.S. beef.
In May 2008, when the country was trapped in heated debate over the resumption of U.S. beef imports and its association with mad cow disease, the actress said in the article, "I would gulp a cup of potassium cyanide rather than eat a piece of American beef infected with the disease."
As the comment drew media attention, an American beef importer in Seoul, A-Meat, filed a suit against the actress and five staff members of an investigative TV journal, PD Notebook, for interrupting its business by spreading what it called "groundless" information about the imported beef. The importer also claimed its bottom line was hit hard by her defamatory article.
But the Seoul Southern District Court Tuesday ruled the actress and the TV program were not liable for any damages to the importer.
Judge Kim Sung-gon said in the ruling, "Her article revealed no specific information associated with the plaintiff. So it cannot be seen that her article interrupted its business." The judge also acquitted the five TV producers, saying the program was wholly based on data they compiled in the belief that they were all scientifically grounded.
"Also, the program was to criticize the government for a deal with Washington allegedly endorsed in a cursory manner, not a specific company," the judge said.
Two years have passed since the social unrest, provoked by the resumption of U.S. beef imports without thorough restrictions to keep risky parts of American beef at bay, ended.
To quell enraged citizens, who took to major streets for three months, President Lee Myung-bak solicited for the U.S. government to modify the terms of the contract signed between the two parties, made public apologies and reshuffled the Cabinet.
But society is still divided and shows no immediate sign of mending the rift. Rather, what is left over from the unrest is still plaguing the administration by providing a ground for ideological showdowns between those in favor of the conservative administration and its opponents, levying a heavy political burden on President Lee, who is in the midst of his five-year presidency.
The latest controversy, associated with the beef scandal two years ago, resurfaced after a court ruling early this month that exonerated the five TV producers from defamation charges.
On Jan. 20, the Seoul Central District Court cleared them on defamation charges for allegedly wrongly portraying the actions of two senior state trade negotiators during the Seoul-Washington talks to resume U.S. beef imports in 2008.
The ruling provoked immediate condemnation from conservative activists and politicians, pressuring the head of the judiciary to step down, calling the verdict a decision based on ideological bias. Some overzealous activists even staged rallies in front of the home of the judge in charge of the case, calling for his resignation.
Liberal activists and politicians condemned their moves, describing a series of acts by their counterparts as politically motivated moves to sway the judiciary, whose independent operation is guaranteed under the Constitution.
Galvanized by the ruling, the ruling Grand National Party is now pushing a package of bills to tighten its grip on the judiciary, while opposition parties are trying to strike down the attempt.
pss@koreatimes.co.kr
flounder Del (71.248.137.150) 02-10-2010 07:39
To Honorable Ms. Kim Min-Sun and Korea,
The Truth will set us free.
Thank You Ma'am ! You are very courageous ! Your Country-man and Country-Woman should be proud. ...TSS
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2010/02/113_60573.html
Wednesday, January 13, 2010
High Court Rules In Favor of PD Notebook 01-13-2010 21:21
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2010/01/high-court-rules-in-favor-of-pd.html
Saturday, August 22, 2009
FREE Kim Min-sun, she is correct about mad cow fears from USDA BEEF
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2009/08/free-kim-min-sun-she-is-correct-about.html
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/01/14th-international-congress-on.html
Saturday, August 22, 2009
FREE Kim Min-sun, she is correct about mad cow fears from USDA BEEF
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2009/08/free-kim-min-sun-she-is-correct-about.html
Sent: Friday, January 29, 2010 3:23 PM
Subject: 14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)
18.173 page 189
Experimental Challenge of Cattle with H-type and L-type Atypical BSE
A. Buschmann1, U. Ziegler1, M. Keller1, R. Rogers2, B. Hills3, M.H. Groschup1. 1Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Greifswald-Insel Riems, Germany, 2Health Canada, Bureau of Microbial Hazards, Health Products & Food Branch, Ottawa, Canada, 3Health Canada, Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Secretariat, Ottawa, Canada
Background: After the detection of two novel BSE forms designated H-type and L-type atypical BSE the question of the pathogenesis and the agent distribution of these two types in cattle was fully open. From initial studies of the brain pathology, it was already known that the anatomical distribution of L-type BSE differs from that of the classical type where the obex region in the brainstem always displays the highest PrPSc concentrations. In contrast in L-type BSE cases, the thalamus and frontal cortex regions showed the highest levels of the pathological prion protein, while the obex region was only weakly involved.
Methods:We performed intracranial inoculations of cattle (five and six per group) using 10%brainstemhomogenates of the two German H- and L-type atypical BSE isolates. The animals were inoculated under narcosis and then kept in a free-ranging stable under appropriate biosafety conditions.At least one animal per group was killed and sectioned in the preclinical stage and the remaining animals were kept until they developed clinical symptoms. The animals were examined for behavioural changes every four weeks throughout the experiment following a protocol that had been established during earlier BSE pathogenesis studies with classical BSE.
Results and Discussion: All animals of both groups developed clinical symptoms and had to be euthanized within 16 months. The clinical picture differed from that of classical BSE, as the earliest signs of illness were loss of body weight and depression. However, the animals later developed hind limb ataxia and hyperesthesia predominantly and the head. Analysis of brain samples from these animals confirmed the BSE infection and the atypical Western blot profile was maintained in all animals. Samples from these animals are now being examined in order to be able to describe the pathogenesis and agent distribution for these novel BSE types. Conclusions: A pilot study using a commercially avaialble BSE rapid test ELISA revealed an essential restriction of PrPSc to the central nervous system for both atypical BSE forms. A much more detailed analysis for PrPSc and infectivity is still ongoing.
http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf
http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml
From: xxxx
To: Terry Singeltary
Sent: Saturday, December 05, 2009 9:09 AM
Subject: 14th ICID - abstract accepted for 'International Scientific Exchange'
Your preliminary abstract number: 670
Dear Mr. Singeltary,
On behalf of the Scientific Committee, I am pleased to inform you that your abstract
'Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009'
WAS accepted for inclusion in the INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE (ISE) section of the 14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases. Accordingly, your abstract will be included in the "Intl. Scientific Exchange abstract CD-rom" of the Congress which will be distributed to all participants.
Abstracts accepted for INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE are NOT PRESENTED in the oral OR poster sessions.
Your abstract below was accepted for: INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE
#0670: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Author: T. Singeltary; Bacliff, TX/US
Topic: Emerging Infectious Diseases Preferred type of presentation: International Scientific Exchange
This abstract has been ACCEPTED.
#0670: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Authors: T. Singeltary; Bacliff, TX/US
Title: Transmissible Spongiform encephalopathy (TSE) animal and human TSE in North America update October 2009
Body: Background
An update on atypical BSE and other TSE in North America. Please remember, the typical U.K. c-BSE, the atypical l-BSE (BASE), and h-BSE have all been documented in North America, along with the typical scrapie's, and atypical Nor-98 Scrapie, and to date, 2 different strains of CWD, and also TME. All these TSE in different species have been rendered and feed to food producing animals for humans and animals in North America (TSE in cats and dogs ?), and that the trading of these TSEs via animals and products via the USA and Canada has been immense over the years, decades.
Methods
12 years independent research of available data
Results
I propose that the current diagnostic criteria for human TSEs only enhances and helps the spreading of human TSE from the continued belief of the UKBSEnvCJD only theory in 2009. With all the science to date refuting it, to continue to validate this old myth, will only spread this TSE agent through a multitude of potential routes and sources i.e. consumption, medical i.e., surgical, blood, dental, endoscopy, optical, nutritional supplements, cosmetics etc.
Conclusion
I would like to submit a review of past CJD surveillance in the USA, and the urgent need to make all human TSE in the USA a reportable disease, in every state, of every age group, and to make this mandatory immediately without further delay. The ramifications of not doing so will only allow this agent to spread further in the medical, dental, surgical arena's. Restricting the reporting of CJD and or any human TSE is NOT scientific. Iatrogenic CJD knows NO age group, TSE knows no boundaries.
I propose as with Aguzzi, Asante, Collinge, Caughey, Deslys, Dormont, Gibbs, Gajdusek, Ironside, Manuelidis, Marsh, et al and many more, that the world of TSE Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy is far from an exact science, but there is enough proven science to date that this myth should be put to rest once and for all, and that we move forward with a new classification for human and animal TSE that would properly identify the infected species, the source species, and then the route.
Keywords: Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease Prion
http://www.isid.org/14th_icid/
http://www.isid.org/publications/ICID_Archive.shtml
http://ww2.isid.org/Downloads/IMED2009_AbstrAuth.pdf
Monday, October 19, 2009
Atypical BSE, BSE, and other human and animal TSE in North America Update October 19, 2009
snip...
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete.
Thanks for your interest.''
Best regards,
Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
END...TSS
I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/10/atypical-bse-bse-and-other-human-and.html
snip... see full text ;
Friday, January 29, 2010
14th International Congress on Infectious Diseases H-type and L-type Atypical BSE January 2010 (special pre-congress edition)
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2010/01/14th-international-congress-on.html
Thursday, February 4, 2010
SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY ADVISORY COMMITTEE Draft Minutes of the 103rd Meeting held on 24th November 2009
http://seac992007.blogspot.com/2010/02/spongiform-encephalopathy-advisory.html
Friday, February 05, 2010
New Variant Creutzfelt Jakob Disease case reports United States 2010 A Review
http://vcjd.blogspot.com/2010/02/new-variant-creutzfelt-jakob-disease.html
past history ;
U.S. slams door on revising S. Korea beef import pact
June 11, 2008, 10:14PM
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/us-slams-door-on-revising-s-korea-beef.html
Wednesday, June 11, 2008
OIE Recognition of the BSE Status of Members RESOLUTION No. XXI (Adopted by the International Committee of the OIE on 27 May 2008)
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/oie-recognition-of-bse-status-of.html
Saturday, June 7, 2008
Export Requirements for the Republic of Korea IMPORT HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. BEEF AND BEEF PRODUCTS
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/06/export-requirements-for-republic-of.html
Why Americans, As Well as Koreans, Should Be Worried About Mad Cow Tainted USA Beef
By Terry S. Singeltary Sr. May 15, 2008
Straight to the Source
Web Note: This is an important commentary by Terry S. Singeltary Sr., on a recent Business Week story on the controversy in South Korea over their government's lifting on the ban on conventional (non-organic) beef, despite the fact that the USDA is still allowing slaughterhouse waste and blood and manure to be fed to cows, and refusing to test all cows at slaughter. See the Mad Cow section of the OCA website for in-depth information. Terry is a regular blogger on the OCA website on Mad Cow issues.
Ronnie Cummins
One Korean official says the probability of a human being catching a mad cow disease by eating U.S. beef is like the one of a golf player scoring a hole-in-one and then being killed by lightning.
this is typical BSe. you here industry groups comment 'your more likely to get hit by a car than die from CJD'. well, maybe so, but my mother and many more did not die from getting hit by a car, they died from CJD, my mothers being the hvCJD (confirmed), and my neighbors mother died from CJD (confirmed). the UKBSEnvCJD _only_ theory is incorrect. there are more strains of mad cow than the UK BSE in beef to nvCJD in humans in the UK. The deception by the USDA, FDA, and the Bush administration about mad cow disease, CJD, and all Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy over the past 8 years have been outrageous, to a point of being criminal. I am vested in nothing, but the truth.
snip...see full text ;
http://www.grassrootsnetroots.org/articles/article_12387.cfm
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Concerned Americans against Mad Cow Disease STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY with Koreans May 13, 2008
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/05/concerned-americans-against-mad-cow.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Showing posts with label mad cow. Show all posts
Showing posts with label mad cow. Show all posts
Wednesday, February 10, 2010
Tuesday, April 14, 2009
Tons of USA Beef Suspected of Mad Cow Disease Sold KOREA
04-14-2009 19:43
Tons of Beef Suspected of Mad Cow Disease Sold
By Kim Rahn Staff Reporter
About 13 tons of American beef were falsely sold as Australian products five years ago in defiance of a disposal order issued after a case of mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), was reported in the United States.
The prosecution indicted two men, identified as Seon and Kim, Monday, for having hoarded the American beef from a discount store where Seon worked and having supplied it to big discount store chains and department stores.
In December 2003, when cows suspected of having the disease were found in the U.S. and Seon's company was ordered to dispose of all American beef, he allegedly destroyed seven tons and falsely reported to the company that he had destroyed the entire 29 tons in the store.
Among the remaining 22 tons, Seon delivered 12.7 tons to discount stores and department stores between August and December 2004. The two fabricated expiration dates of the products and labeled them as ``Australian beef,'' raking in 280 million won in revenue. The products sold out.
Seon claimed that they did not distribute about 10 tons of the remaining products, but prosecutors suspect they did, requesting a tax agency audit Kim's company.
The prosecution is considering expanding the investigation into other meat distributors to search for similar cases.
mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000162/!x-usc:mailto:rahnita@koreatimes.co.kr
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/04/117_43177.html
Why Americans, As Well as Koreans, Should Be Worried About Mad Cow Tainted USA Beef By Terry S. Singeltary Sr. May 15, 2008 Straight to the Source
Web Note: This is an important commentary by Terry S. Singeltary Sr., on a recent Business Week story on the controversy in South Korea over their government's lifting on the ban on conventional (non-organic) beef, despite the fact that the USDA is still allowing slaughterhouse waste and blood and manure to be fed to cows, and refusing to test all cows at slaughter. See the Mad Cow section of the OCA website for in-depth information. Terry is a regular blogger on the OCA website on Mad Cow issues.
Ronnie Cummins
http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_12387.cfm
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3940
http://www.testcowsnow.com/export-of-beef-and-beef-products-to-korea-usda-fsis-notice-expires-7109-opi-oppd
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/05/usda-vs-korea-typical-or-atypical-bse.html
*** 2009 ***
P26
TRANSMISSION OF ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN HUMANIZED MOUSE MODELS
Liuting Qing1, Fusong Chen1, Michael Payne1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5*, and Qingzhong Kong1 1Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA; 2CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University, Diagnostic Medicine/Pathobiology Department, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA. *Previous address: USDA National Animal Disease Center, Ames, IA 50010, USA
Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Two atypical BSE strains, BSE-L (also named BASE) and BSE-H, have been discovered in three continents since 2004. The first case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PrP gene (termed BSE-M) was also found in 2006 in the USA. The transmissibility and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains/isolates in humans were unknown. We have inoculated humanized transgenic mice with classical and atypical BSE strains (BSE-C, BSE-L, BSE-H) and the BSE-M isolate. We have found that the atypical BSE-L strain is much more virulent than the classical BSE-C. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible in the humanized transgenic mice with distinct phenotype, but no transmission has been observed for the BSE-M isolate so far.
III International Symposium on THE NEW PRION BIOLOGY: BASIC SCIENCE, DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 2 - 4 APRIL 2009, VENEZIA (ITALY)
http://www.istitutoveneto.it/prion_09/Abstracts_09.pdf
Research Project: GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE SUSCEPTIBILITY Location: Animal Health Systems Research
Title: Association of a bovine prion gene haplotype with atypical BSE
Author
Clawson, Michael
Submitted to: Meeting Abstract Publication Type: Abstract Publication Acceptance Date: December 2, 2008 Publication Date: January 1, 2009 Citation: Clawson, M.L. 2009. Association of a bovine prion gene haplotype with atypical BSE [abstract]. Plant and Animal Genomes XVII Conference. Abstract No. W091. Available:
http://www.intl-pag.org/17/abstracts/
Technical Abstract: Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), also known as prion diseases, are a class of fatal neurodegenerative disorders that occur in humans, ruminants, cats, and mink. Three distinct TSEs afflict cattle: classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), atypical H-type BSE, and atypical L-type BSE. Classical BSE was identified in the 1980s and is acquired by cattle through the consumption of feed contaminated with the infectious prion agent. Atypical BSEs have only recently been recognized as distinct cattle prion diseases and are extremely rare. The full extent of genetic susceptibilities to atypical BSEs is unknown; however, one atypical H-type case identified in the United States (2006) was most likely caused by a genetic mutation in the prion gene, E211K. We have identified an association of a bovine prion DNA haplotype with atypical BSE that is independent of E211K. The haplotype spans a portion of the prion gene that includes part of intron 2, the entire coding region of exon 3, and part of the three prime untranslated region of exon 3 (13 kb). Despite the low frequency of this haplotype among general cattle populations, it was present in a majority of H- and L-type atypical BSE cases from Canada, France, and the United States. This result indicates that there is a genetic component to atypical BSE susceptibility in addition to E211K.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=234699
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.''
Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
END...TSS
I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS
Month Number of Tests
Feb 2009 -- 1,891
Jan 2009 -- 4,620
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/ongoing_surv_results.shtml
P02.35
Molecular Features of the Protease-resistant Prion Protein (PrPres) in H-type BSE
Biacabe, A-G1; Jacobs, JG2; Gavier-Widén, D3; Vulin, J1; Langeveld, JPM2; Baron, TGM1 1AFSSA, France; 2CIDC-Lelystad, Netherlands; 3SVA, Sweden
Western blot analyses of PrPres accumulating in the brain of BSE-infected cattle have demonstrated 3 different molecular phenotypes regarding to the apparent molecular masses and glycoform ratios of PrPres bands. We initially described isolates (H-type BSE) essentially characterized by higher PrPres molecular mass and decreased levels of the diglycosylated PrPres band, in contrast to the classical type of BSE. This type is also distinct from another BSE phenotype named L-type BSE, or also BASE (for Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy), mainly characterized by a low representation of the diglycosylated PrPres band as well as a lower PrPres molecular mass. Retrospective molecular studies in France of all available BSE cases older than 8 years old and of part of the other cases identified since the beginning of the exhaustive surveillance of the disease in 20001 allowed to identify 7 H-type BSE cases, among 594 BSE cases that could be classified as classical, L- or H-type BSE. By Western blot analysis of H-type PrPres, we described a remarkable specific feature with antibodies raised against the C-terminal region of PrP that demonstrated the existence of a more C-terminal cleaved form of PrPres (named PrPres#2 ), in addition to the usual PrPres form (PrPres #1). In the unglycosylated form, PrPres #2 migrates at about 14 kDa, compared to 20 kDa for PrPres #1. The proportion of the PrPres#2 in cattle seems to by higher compared to the PrPres#1. Furthermore another PK-resistant fragment at about 7 kDa was detected by some more N-terminal antibodies and presumed to be the result of cleavages of both N- and C-terminal parts of PrP. These singular features were maintained after transmission of the disease to C57Bl/6 mice. The identification of these two additional PrPres fragments (PrPres #2 and 7kDa band) reminds features reported respectively in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker (GSS) syndrome in humans.
http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2007/abstract_book.pdf
Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock
Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Project Type: Specific Cooperative Agreement
Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2009
Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.
Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009
Both of the BSE cases ascertained in the US native-born cattle were atypical cases (H-type), which contributed to the initial ambiguity of the diagnosis. 174, 185 In Canada, there have been 2 atypical BSE cases in addition to the 14 cases of the classic UK strain of BSE2: one was the H-type, and the other was of the L-type.198
snip...end
source :
Enhanced Abstract Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association January 1, 2009, Vol. 234, No. 1, Pages 59-72
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Jane L. Harman, DVM, PhD; Christopher J. Silva, PhD
http://avmajournals.avma.org/doi/ref/10.2460/javma.234.1.59
Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html
Thursday, April 9, 2009
Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/04/docket-no-fda2002n0031-formerly-docket.html
full text ;
Sunday, April 12, 2009 TRANSMISSION OF ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN HUMANIZED MOUSE MODELS
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/04/transmission-of-atypical-bovine.html
Thursday, March 19, 2009
MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
Thursday, March 19, 2009
Chronic Wasting Disease Prions in Elk Antler Velvet (Nutritional Supplements and CJD)
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2009/03/chronic-wasting-disease-prions-in-elk.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Tons of Beef Suspected of Mad Cow Disease Sold
By Kim Rahn Staff Reporter
About 13 tons of American beef were falsely sold as Australian products five years ago in defiance of a disposal order issued after a case of mad cow disease, or bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), was reported in the United States.
The prosecution indicted two men, identified as Seon and Kim, Monday, for having hoarded the American beef from a discount store where Seon worked and having supplied it to big discount store chains and department stores.
In December 2003, when cows suspected of having the disease were found in the U.S. and Seon's company was ordered to dispose of all American beef, he allegedly destroyed seven tons and falsely reported to the company that he had destroyed the entire 29 tons in the store.
Among the remaining 22 tons, Seon delivered 12.7 tons to discount stores and department stores between August and December 2004. The two fabricated expiration dates of the products and labeled them as ``Australian beef,'' raking in 280 million won in revenue. The products sold out.
Seon claimed that they did not distribute about 10 tons of the remaining products, but prosecutors suspect they did, requesting a tax agency audit Kim's company.
The prosecution is considering expanding the investigation into other meat distributors to search for similar cases.
mhtml:%7B33B38F65-8D2E-434D-8F9B-8BDCD77D3066%7Dmid://00000162/!x-usc:mailto:rahnita@koreatimes.co.kr
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2009/04/117_43177.html
Why Americans, As Well as Koreans, Should Be Worried About Mad Cow Tainted USA Beef By Terry S. Singeltary Sr. May 15, 2008 Straight to the Source
Web Note: This is an important commentary by Terry S. Singeltary Sr., on a recent Business Week story on the controversy in South Korea over their government's lifting on the ban on conventional (non-organic) beef, despite the fact that the USDA is still allowing slaughterhouse waste and blood and manure to be fed to cows, and refusing to test all cows at slaughter. See the Mad Cow section of the OCA website for in-depth information. Terry is a regular blogger on the OCA website on Mad Cow issues.
Ronnie Cummins
http://www.organicconsumers.org/articles/article_12387.cfm
http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/3940
http://www.testcowsnow.com/export-of-beef-and-beef-products-to-korea-usda-fsis-notice-expires-7109-opi-oppd
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/05/usda-vs-korea-typical-or-atypical-bse.html
*** 2009 ***
P26
TRANSMISSION OF ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN HUMANIZED MOUSE MODELS
Liuting Qing1, Fusong Chen1, Michael Payne1, Wenquan Zou1, Cristina Casalone2, Martin Groschup3, Miroslaw Polak4, Maria Caramelli2, Pierluigi Gambetti1, Juergen Richt5*, and Qingzhong Kong1 1Department of Pathology, Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH 44106, USA; 2CEA, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale, Italy; 3Friedrich-Loeffler-Institut, Germany; 4National Veterinary Research Institute, Poland; 5Kansas State University, Diagnostic Medicine/Pathobiology Department, Manhattan, KS 66506, USA. *Previous address: USDA National Animal Disease Center, Ames, IA 50010, USA
Classical BSE is a world-wide prion disease in cattle, and the classical BSE strain (BSE-C) has led to over 200 cases of clinical human infection (variant CJD). Two atypical BSE strains, BSE-L (also named BASE) and BSE-H, have been discovered in three continents since 2004. The first case of naturally occurring BSE with mutated bovine PrP gene (termed BSE-M) was also found in 2006 in the USA. The transmissibility and phenotypes of these atypical BSE strains/isolates in humans were unknown. We have inoculated humanized transgenic mice with classical and atypical BSE strains (BSE-C, BSE-L, BSE-H) and the BSE-M isolate. We have found that the atypical BSE-L strain is much more virulent than the classical BSE-C. The atypical BSE-H strain is also transmissible in the humanized transgenic mice with distinct phenotype, but no transmission has been observed for the BSE-M isolate so far.
III International Symposium on THE NEW PRION BIOLOGY: BASIC SCIENCE, DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 2 - 4 APRIL 2009, VENEZIA (ITALY)
http://www.istitutoveneto.it/prion_09/Abstracts_09.pdf
Research Project: GENETIC AND BIOLOGICAL DETERMINANTS OF RESPIRATORY DISEASE SUSCEPTIBILITY Location: Animal Health Systems Research
Title: Association of a bovine prion gene haplotype with atypical BSE
Author
Clawson, Michael
Submitted to: Meeting Abstract Publication Type: Abstract Publication Acceptance Date: December 2, 2008 Publication Date: January 1, 2009 Citation: Clawson, M.L. 2009. Association of a bovine prion gene haplotype with atypical BSE [abstract]. Plant and Animal Genomes XVII Conference. Abstract No. W091. Available:
http://www.intl-pag.org/17/abstracts/
Technical Abstract: Transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSEs), also known as prion diseases, are a class of fatal neurodegenerative disorders that occur in humans, ruminants, cats, and mink. Three distinct TSEs afflict cattle: classical bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE), atypical H-type BSE, and atypical L-type BSE. Classical BSE was identified in the 1980s and is acquired by cattle through the consumption of feed contaminated with the infectious prion agent. Atypical BSEs have only recently been recognized as distinct cattle prion diseases and are extremely rare. The full extent of genetic susceptibilities to atypical BSEs is unknown; however, one atypical H-type case identified in the United States (2006) was most likely caused by a genetic mutation in the prion gene, E211K. We have identified an association of a bovine prion DNA haplotype with atypical BSE that is independent of E211K. The haplotype spans a portion of the prion gene that includes part of intron 2, the entire coding region of exon 3, and part of the three prime untranslated region of exon 3 (13 kb). Despite the low frequency of this haplotype among general cattle populations, it was present in a majority of H- and L-type atypical BSE cases from Canada, France, and the United States. This result indicates that there is a genetic component to atypical BSE susceptibility in addition to E211K.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/publications/publications.htm?SEQ_NO_115=234699
I ask Professor Kong ;
Thursday, December 04, 2008 3:37 PM Subject: RE: re--Chronic Wating Disease (CWD) and Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathies (BSE): Public Health Risk Assessment
''IS the h-BSE more virulent than typical BSE as well, or the same as cBSE, or less virulent than cBSE? just curious.....''
Professor Kong reply ;
.....snip
''As to the H-BSE, we do not have sufficient data to say one way or another, but we have found that H-BSE can infect humans. I hope we could publish these data once the study is complete. Thanks for your interest.''
Best regards, Qingzhong Kong, PhD Associate Professor Department of Pathology Case Western Reserve University Cleveland, OH 44106 USA
END...TSS
I look forward to further transmission studies, and a true ENHANCED BSE/atypical BSE surveillance program put forth testing all cattle for human and animal consumption for 5 years. a surveillance program that uses the most sensitive TSE testing, and has the personnel that knows how to use them, and can be trusted. I look forward to a stringent mad cow feed ban being put forth, and then strictly enforced. we need a forced, not voluntary feed ban, an enhanced feed ban at that, especially excluding blood. we need some sort of animal traceability. no more excuses about privacy. if somebody is putting out a product that is killing folks and or has the potential to kill you, then everybody needs to know who they are, and where that product came from. same with hospitals, i think medical incidents in all states should be recorded, and made public, when it comes to something like a potential accidental transmission exposure event. so if someone is out there looking at a place to go have surgery done, if you have several hospitals having these type 'accidental exposure events', than you can go some place else. it only makes sense. somewhere along the road, the consumer lost control, and just had to take whatever they were given, and then charged these astronomical prices. some where along the line the consumer just lost interest, especially on a long incubating disease such as mad cow disease i.e. Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy. like i said before, there is much more to the mad cow story than bovines and eating a hamburger, we must start focusing on all TSE in all species. ...TSS
Month Number of Tests
Feb 2009 -- 1,891
Jan 2009 -- 4,620
http://www.aphis.usda.gov/newsroom/hot_issues/bse/surveillance/ongoing_surv_results.shtml
P02.35
Molecular Features of the Protease-resistant Prion Protein (PrPres) in H-type BSE
Biacabe, A-G1; Jacobs, JG2; Gavier-Widén, D3; Vulin, J1; Langeveld, JPM2; Baron, TGM1 1AFSSA, France; 2CIDC-Lelystad, Netherlands; 3SVA, Sweden
Western blot analyses of PrPres accumulating in the brain of BSE-infected cattle have demonstrated 3 different molecular phenotypes regarding to the apparent molecular masses and glycoform ratios of PrPres bands. We initially described isolates (H-type BSE) essentially characterized by higher PrPres molecular mass and decreased levels of the diglycosylated PrPres band, in contrast to the classical type of BSE. This type is also distinct from another BSE phenotype named L-type BSE, or also BASE (for Bovine Amyloid Spongiform Encephalopathy), mainly characterized by a low representation of the diglycosylated PrPres band as well as a lower PrPres molecular mass. Retrospective molecular studies in France of all available BSE cases older than 8 years old and of part of the other cases identified since the beginning of the exhaustive surveillance of the disease in 20001 allowed to identify 7 H-type BSE cases, among 594 BSE cases that could be classified as classical, L- or H-type BSE. By Western blot analysis of H-type PrPres, we described a remarkable specific feature with antibodies raised against the C-terminal region of PrP that demonstrated the existence of a more C-terminal cleaved form of PrPres (named PrPres#2 ), in addition to the usual PrPres form (PrPres #1). In the unglycosylated form, PrPres #2 migrates at about 14 kDa, compared to 20 kDa for PrPres #1. The proportion of the PrPres#2 in cattle seems to by higher compared to the PrPres#1. Furthermore another PK-resistant fragment at about 7 kDa was detected by some more N-terminal antibodies and presumed to be the result of cleavages of both N- and C-terminal parts of PrP. These singular features were maintained after transmission of the disease to C57Bl/6 mice. The identification of these two additional PrPres fragments (PrPres #2 and 7kDa band) reminds features reported respectively in sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease and in Gerstmann-Sträussler-Scheinker (GSS) syndrome in humans.
http://www.neuroprion.com/pdf_docs/conferences/prion2007/abstract_book.pdf
Research Project: Study of Atypical Bse Location: Virus and Prion Diseases of Livestock
Project Number: 3625-32000-086-05 Project Type: Specific Cooperative Agreement
Start Date: Sep 15, 2004 End Date: Sep 14, 2009
Objective: The objective of this cooperative research project with Dr. Maria Caramelli from the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory in Turin, Italy, is to conduct comparative studies with the U.S. bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) isolate and the atypical BSE isolates identified in Italy. The studies will cover the following areas: 1. Evaluation of present diagnostics tools used in the U.S. for the detection of atypical BSE cases. 2. Molecular comparison of the U.S. BSE isolate and other typical BSE isolates with atypical BSE cases. 3. Studies on transmissibility and tissue distribution of atypical BSE isolates in cattle and other species.
Approach: This project will be done as a Specific Cooperative Agreement with the Italian BSE Reference Laboratory, Istituto Zooprofilattico Sperimentale del Piemonte, in Turin, Italy. It is essential for the U.S. BSE surveillance program to analyze the effectiveness of the U.S diagnostic tools for detection of atypical cases of BSE. Molecular comparisons of the U.S. BSE isolate with atypical BSE isolates will provide further characterization of the U.S. BSE isolate. Transmission studies are already underway using brain homogenates from atypical BSE cases into mice, cattle and sheep. It will be critical to see whether the atypical BSE isolates behave similarly to typical BSE isolates in terms of transmissibility and disease pathogenesis. If transmission occurs, tissue distribution comparisons will be made between cattle infected with the atypical BSE isolate and the U.S. BSE isolate. Differences in tissue distribution could require new regulations regarding specific risk material (SRM) removal.
http://www.ars.usda.gov/research/projects/projects.htm?ACCN_NO=408490
Wednesday, February 11, 2009
Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009
Both of the BSE cases ascertained in the US native-born cattle were atypical cases (H-type), which contributed to the initial ambiguity of the diagnosis. 174, 185 In Canada, there have been 2 atypical BSE cases in addition to the 14 cases of the classic UK strain of BSE2: one was the H-type, and the other was of the L-type.198
snip...end
source :
Enhanced Abstract Journal of the American Veterinary Medical Association January 1, 2009, Vol. 234, No. 1, Pages 59-72
Bovine spongiform encephalopathy
Jane L. Harman, DVM, PhD; Christopher J. Silva, PhD
http://avmajournals.avma.org/doi/ref/10.2460/javma.234.1.59
Atypical BSE North America Update February 2009
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/02/atypical-bse-north-america-update.html
Thursday, April 9, 2009
Docket No. FDA2002N0031 (formerly Docket No. 2002N0273) RIN 0910AF46 Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed; Final Rule: Proposed
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/04/docket-no-fda2002n0031-formerly-docket.html
full text ;
Sunday, April 12, 2009 TRANSMISSION OF ATYPICAL BOVINE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY (BSE) IN HUMANIZED MOUSE MODELS
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2009/04/transmission-of-atypical-bovine.html
Thursday, March 19, 2009
MILLIONS AND MILLIONS OF POUNDS OF MAD COW FEED IN COMMERCE USA
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2009/03/millions-and-millions-of-pounds-of-mad.html
Thursday, March 19, 2009
Chronic Wasting Disease Prions in Elk Antler Velvet (Nutritional Supplements and CJD)
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2009/03/chronic-wasting-disease-prions-in-elk.html
Terry S. Singeltary Sr. P.O. Box 42 Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
Saturday, June 7, 2008
Export Requirements for the Republic of Korea IMPORT HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. BEEF AND BEEF PRODUCTS
Export Requirements for the Republic of Korea
KS-73 (Apr 23, 2008)
Asterisks (*) indicate the most recent revision to these requirements. To search, click on your browser's "Edit" menu, then click on "Find (on this page)". Enter "*" in the "Find What" field, then click "Find" or "Find Next" until all asterisks have been identified.
Eligible/Ineligible Products
Eligible product
Although the United States and Korea have reached general agreement on the resumption of export of U.S. beef and beef products to Korea, FSIS officials should not issue export certificates for beef and beef products intended for export to Korea at this time. Additional information about the specific conditions, including eligible product, plant approval, and certification requirements are being developed and will be made available as soon as possible. Establishment management may contact AMS at 540-361-7640 for information about AMS program requirements.*
snip...end
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/Republic_of_Korea_Requirements/index.asp
Greetings,
please see the 'meat of the issue' on import health requirements for the U.S. beef and beef products to Korea, or the lack of, as follows ;
IMPORT HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. BEEF AND BEEF PRODUCTS
Import Health Requirements for U.S. Beef and Beef Products
The following import health requirements shall be applied to beef and beef products exported from the United States of America ("United States") to the Republic of Korea ("Korea").
Definitions
1. Definitions for the purpose of these health requirements are as follows:
(1) "Beef or beef products" includes all edible parts of cattle less than 30 months of age at the time of slaughter and products derived from all edible parts of cattle less than 30 months of age at the time of slaughter as described in the U.S. Federal Meat Inspection Act. However, "beef or beef products" excludes specified risk materials (SRMs); all mechanically recovered meat (MRM)/mechanically separated meat (MSM); and advanced meat recovery product (AMR) from the skull and vertebral column of cattle 30 months of age and over at the time of slaughter. AMR that is free of SRMs and central nervous system tissues (CNS) is allowed. Ground meat, processed products and beef extracts may contain AMR but excludes specified risk materials (SRMs) and all MRM/MSM.
(2) "BSE" means Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy.
(3) "Cattle" means domesticated bovine animals (Bos taurus and Bos indicus) born and raised in the United States, legally imported into the United States from a country deemed eligible by the Korean government to export beef or beef products to Korea, or raised in the United States for at least 100 days prior to slaughter.
(4) "Food-safety hazard" means any biological, chemical, or physical property that may cause food to be unsafe for human consumption.
(5) "Lot" means a quantity of beef or beef products identified on a single export certificate from one meat establishment, and consists of the same process category and product standard of identity (sub-category).
(6) "Meat establishment" includes any slaughterhouse, processing plant, and storage facility for beef or beef products that operates under U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) inspection.
(7) "Non-compliance" means an inconsistency with this protocol that does not constitute a food-safety hazard.
(8) "Serious non-compliance" means a food-safety hazard in a shipped product or a food-safety hazard found during a system audit.
(9) "Specified risk materials" (SRMs) means:
(a) tonsils and distal ileum from cattle of all ages; and
(b) brain, eyes, spinal cord, skull, dorsal root ganglia (DRG) and vertebral column (excluding vertebrae of the tail, transverse processes and spinous processes of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, median crest and wings of the sacrum) from cattle 30 months of age and over at the time of slaughter.(10) "United States" (U.S.) means the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
General Requirements
2. Prior to the loading of the beef or beef products:
(a) the United States has been free of foot-and-mouth disease for the past 12 months and has been free of rinderpest, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, lumpy skin disease and Rift Valley fever for the past 24 months; and
(b) Vaccination has not been carried out against the aforementioned diseases.
Notwithstanding the above, in the event the Korean government recognizes that effective stamping-out policies ar e in place for the specific disease in the United States, including emergency vaccination if carried out, the required period for recognizing the United States as being free of that disease may be shortened in accordance with World Organization for Animal Health (OlE) guidelines after Korea conducts a risk analysis.
3. In the event a disease set out in item 2 occurs in the United States, the U.S. government shall immediately suspend the issuance of export certificates for all beef and beef products to Korea that do not meet the requirements of item 2.
4. The U.S. government, in accordance with U.S. regulations, continuously maintains measures that meet or exceed OlE guidelines for controlled-risk status to effectively detect and prevent the introduction and spread of BSE. The U.S. government will provide notice to the World Trade Organization (WTO) -according to its WTO commitments -and inform Korea regarding the repeal or amendment of any BSE-related measure.
5. In the event (an) additional case(s) of BSE occur(s) in the United States, the U.S. government shall immediately conduct a thorough epidemiological investigation and inform the Korean government of the results of the investigation. The U.S. government will consult with the Korean government about the findings of the investigation. The Korean government will suspend the importation of beef and beef products if the additional case(s) results in the OlE recognizing an adverse change in the classification of the U.S. BSE status.
Requirements for Meat Establishments
6. Any meat establishment in the United States that operates under USDA inspection is eligible to produce beef or beef products for Korea. The establishment should be notified to the Korean government in advance.
7. The U.S. government will maintain a regular monitoring and aUditing program for meat establishments that produce beef or beef products for export to Korea to ensure they comply with the relevant provisions of these health requirements and U.S. regulations. In the event of a serious non-compliance, the Food Safely and Inspection Service (FSIS) personnel would issue a Noncompliance Record and would immediately control the non-compliant product If the process that resulted in the non-compliant product is on-going, FSIS would immediately stop the process until it determines tha t appropriate corrective and preventative measures have been taken. Only when FSIS determines that corrective actions are adequate will production be allowed to resume. The U.S. government will inform the Korean government if an establishment is suspended and when corrective action has been taken.
8. The Korean government may conduct on-site aUdits of a representative sample of the meat establishments that export beef or beef products to Korea. When a serious non-compliance with these health requirements has been found as a result of the on-site audit, the Korean government will inform the results to the U.S. government, and the U.S. government shall take appropriate measures and inform the Korean government of the measures taken.
9. The U.S. government shall verify that a suspended meat establishment has determined and implemented appropriate corrective and preventative measures before lifting the suspension described in item 7, item B or item 24. The U.S. government shall inform the Korean government of the corrective action the meat establishment has taken and of the date the meat establishmenfs suspension is lifted.
Requirements for Beef and Beef Products
10. The beef or beef products were derived from cattle born and raised in the United States, from cattle legally imported into the United States from a country deemed eligible by the Korean government to export beef or beef products to Korea, or from cattle raised in the United States for at least 100 days prior to slaughter.
11. Cattle for producing beef or beef products for export were not suspect or confirmed BSE cases; confirmed progenies of BSE cases; or confirmed cohorts of BSE cases, as defined in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code adopted by the OlE.
12. Meat establishments that produce beef or beef products shall maintain a program for the hygienic removal of SRMs.
13. For the purpose of SRM removal, the age of cattle at the time of slaughter was verified by documentation which identifies the age or by dentition.
14. The meat establishments maintain purchase records indicating the facility from which the animals were purchased for slaughter. Records may be disposed of two years after the date of purchase.
15. The beef or beef products were derived from cattle that were slaughtered in meat establishments (slaughterhouses) certified by th e U.S. government as eligible to export beef and beef products to Korea and that passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection conducted by USDA inspection personnel under the supervision of the resident USDA veterinarian.
16. The beef or beef products were derived from cattle that were not subjected to a stunning process, prior to slaughter, with a device injecting compressed air or gas into the cranial cavity, or to a pithing process.
17. The beef or beef products were produced and handled in a manner as to prevent contamination from SRMs or from MSM from the skull and vertebral column of cattle 30 months of age and over, in accordance with FSIS regulations.
18. Residues (radioactivity, synthetic antibiotic sUbstances, antibiotic substances, heavy metals, pesticides, hormones, etc.) posing a public health hazard and pathogenic microorganisms in the beef and beef products shall not exceed the tolerance levels established by the Korean government. The beef and beef products may be treated with ionizing radiation, ultraviolet rays, and tenderizers in accordance with Korean regUlations.
19. Sanitary packaging material was used to package the beef or beef products.
20. The processing, storage and transportation of the beef an d beef products were handled in such a manner as to prevent contamination by communicable animal disease pathogens.
21. Refrigerated or cold storage rooms on a ship (aircraft) or container that transports the beef and beef products were sealed by using the seal of the U.S. government or a U.S. government-recognized seal and then certified by a U.S. government veterinarian.
Export Certificate
22. Beef and beef products qualify for import quarantine inspection if accompanied by the Export Certificate of Wholesomeness and the Certificate for Export of Beef and Beef Products to the Republic of Korea (ROK) issued by the veterinary authority of the U.S. government, which include the following information to be submitted to the quarantine authority of the Korean government:
(1) Information responsive to items 2,10 and 15-20 above;
(2) Name of the product (including species), number of packages and weight (net weight) listed by each final processing plant;
(3) Names, addresses and establishment numbers of the slaughterhouse, meat processing plant and storage facility;
(4) Slaughtering period and/or processing period (dd/mmJyy-dd/mm/yy);
(5) Names and addresses of the consignor and the consignee;
(6) Date the export certificate was issued and the name and signature of the issuer; and
(7) Container number and seal number.
Import Quarantine Inspection and Regulatory Action
23. If the Korean government detects a food-safety hazard in a lot during the quarantine inspection process, it may reject the lot. The Korean government shall notify and consult with the U.S. government regarding the matter and may request corrective action if appropriate. If an SRM is found, FSIS will conduct an investigation to determine the cause of the problem. Product pro duced by the pertinent me at establishment shall continue to be eligible for import quarantine inspection. However, the Korean government will increase the rate of inspection of subsequent beef and beef products from the meat establishment. After the Korean government inspects five lots of equal or greater quantity of the same product wnhout finding a food-safety hazard, the Korean government shall apply its standard inspection procedures and rates.
24. If the Korean government observes at least two incidents of food-safety hazards involving separate lots from the same meat establishment, the meat establishment may be suspended until corrective action has been taken. Beef and beef products of the meat establishment that were certified prior to the date of suspension shall continue to be eligible for import quarantine inspection. An establishment shall remain suspended until the U.S. government verifies to the Korean government that corrective actions have been completed. The U.S. government shall inform the Korean government of the meat establishment's corrective action and of the date the meat establishmenfs suspension is lifted. The Korean government may include an on-site audit of the establishment during its next system audit in the United States.
Consultations
25. The Korean government or the U.S. government may request consultations with the other concerning any matter regarding the interpretation or application of these import health requirements. Unless otherwise agreed, the consultations shall be held within seven days of the request in the territory of the government that receives the request.
Addendum
1. This notice will go into effect on the date of its notification.
2. When the United States publicly announces its enhanced feed ban, Article 1(1) shall be modified to read as follows: "beef or beef products" includes all edible parts of cattle and products derived from all edible parts of cattle as described in the U.S. Federal Meat Inspection Act. However, "beef or beef products" excludes specified risk materials (SRMs); all mechanically recovered meat (MRM) /mechanically separated meat (MSM); and advanced meat recovery product (AMR) from the skull and vertebral column of cattle 30 months of age and over at the time of slaughter. AMR that is free of SRMs and central nervous system tissues (CNS) is allowed. Ground meat, processed products and beef extracts may contain AMR but excludes specified risk materials (SRMs) and all MRM/MSM.
3. During the first 90 days following the effective date of these import health requirements, Korea may audit and/or reject U.S. decisions regarding the listing of new plants or re-Iisting of previously de-listed plants.
4. During the first 180 days following the effective date of these import health requirements, exports of T-bone and Porterhouse steaks will be accompanied by some notation on the box that confirms for Korean officials that these cuts of beef come from cattle under 30 months of age. The Korean government and the U.S. government agree to have consultations upon the completion of the 180 day period with a view to addressing concerns after reviewing the notation's effect on beef trade and its inspection.
Min Dong-Seck
Deputy Minister
MIFAFF
On behalf of Korea
A. Ellen Terpstra
Deputy Under Secretary
USDA
On behalf of the United States
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/import_requirements_eng_both_sign.pdf
Why Americans, As Well as Koreans, Should Be Worried About Mad Cow Tainted USA Beef
By Terry S. Singeltary Sr. May 15, 2008
Straight to the Source
Web Note: This is an important commentary by Terry S. Singeltary Sr., on a recent Business Week story on the controversy in South Korea over their government's lifting on the ban on conventional (non-organic) beef, despite the fact that the USDA is still allowing slaughterhouse waste and blood and manure to be fed to cows, and refusing to test all cows at slaughter. See the Mad Cow section of the OCA website for in-depth information. Terry is a regular blogger on the OCA website on Mad Cow issues.
Ronnie Cummins
One Korean official says the probability of a human being catching a mad cow disease by eating U.S. beef is like the one of a golf player scoring a hole-in-one and then being killed by lightning.
this is typical BSe. you here industry groups comment 'your more likely to get hit by a car than die from CJD'. well, maybe so, but my mother and many more did not die from getting hit by a car, they died from CJD, my mothers being the hvCJD (confirmed), and my neighbors mother died from CJD (confirmed). the UKBSEnvCJD _only_ theory is incorrect. there are more strains of mad cow than the UK BSE in beef to nvCJD in humans in the UK. The deception by the USDA, FDA, and the Bush administration about mad cow disease, CJD, and all Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy over the past 8 years have been outrageous, to a point of being criminal. I am vested in nothing, but the truth.
snip...see full text ;
http://www.grassrootsnetroots.org/articles/article_12387.cfm
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Concerned Americans against Mad Cow Disease STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY with Koreans May 13, 2008
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/05/concerned-americans-against-mad-cow.html
http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/concerned-americans-against-mad-cow-disease-statement-of-solidarity-with-koreans-may-13-2008.html
http://www.koreantopnews.com/story.php?title=USDA_VS_KOREA_typical_or_atypical_BSe_Concerned_Americans_against_Mad_Cow_Disease_STATEMENT_OF_SOLIDARITY_with_Koreans_May_13_2008
BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS
http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/
http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/bse-youngest-age-statistics-under-30-months.html
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Texas Legend Ranch OAI 05/10/2008
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/05/fda-bseruminant-feed-inspections-firms.html
"South Korea may demand revision of US beef import pact"
"The agreement, struck last month, has been widely criticized as making too"
"many concessions to the United States"
THE PEOPLE of Korea _should_ be mad about the importing of USA beef into their Country. can you believe these regulations? even IF a BSE case(s) are documented in the USA, the people of Korea still cannot suspend the importing of U.S. beef, NO matter how many more mad cows the USA finds, until a thorough epidemiological investigation is finished. please remember, it took over a year and literally an act of congress to confirm the atypical mad cow in Texas before they finally finish that epidemiological investigation, and even after all that, the Koreans still cannot ban USA beef, until the OIE recognizes an adverse change in the classification of the U.S. BSE status. Considering the USDA and the OIE collaborated to seal the deal of the BSE MRR policy (the legal trading of all strains of TSE globally, just for commodities and futures sake, human health was not even considered), I doubt the OIE would ever change the BSE status for the USA, no matter how many more mad cows are found. It's all about money folks.
WE are talking years now, before the Koreans could ever suspend USA beef due to a BSE case(s) ever being documented in the USA, due to these stupid regulations. This is nothing more than FORCE FEEDING KOREA USDA MAD COW BEEF, i.e. all for a dollar, to hell with human health on a disease with an incubation period of years if not a decade or more.
Please remember, the last two mad cows documented in the USA i.e. Alabama and Texas, both were of the 'atypical' BSE strain, and immediately after that, the USDA shut down the testing from 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in 2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered. also, science is showing that some of these atypical cases are more virulent to humans than the typical UK BSE strain ;
***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***
Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center
An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD
April 3, 2008
http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45
IF BSE is not in the USA (just not documented for many different reasons), and only atypical BSE is in the USA (plus CWD, plus, many strains of Scrapie, and Now the Nor-98 documented in 5 different states, plus TME, then why would human mad cow in the USA look like the UK nvCJD from UK BSE cows ? it was shown long ago in studies at Mission Texas that experimental transmission of USA Scrapie to USA Bovine, DID NOT LOOK LIKE UK BSE. so again, in short, why would human mad cow in the USA look like human mad cow in the UK i.e. the (nvCJD). however, I believe that BSE has been in the USA untested and undocumented for years. why on earth then does the USDA refuse to allow creekstone or anyone else test their product? simple, if you don't look/test, you don't find.
ONE only has to read how the USDA et al have legally blocked, blundered, botched, mismanaged, bungled, floundered, and flat out manipulated, the testing in the infamous June 2004 enhanced cover-up program for mad cow surveillance and testing. I mean, I am not really to hip on THE INDUSTRY, testing for mad cow disease, and what that program might consist of, but anything is better than nothing at all. ...
BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html
In 2007, in one weekly enforcement report, the fda recalled 10,000,000+ pounds of BANNED MAD COW FEED, 'in commerce', and i can tell you that most of it was fed out ;
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
snip... see listings and references of enormous amounts of banned mad cow protein 'in commerce' in 2006 and 2005 ;
see full text ;
Friday, April 25, 2008
Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS
http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html
Sunday, April 20, 2008 Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center April 3, 2008
Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.
see full text ;
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2008/04/progress-report-from-national-prion.html
CJD TEXAS (cjd clusters)
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/
CJD USA RISING
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
[In submitting these data, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. draws attention to the steady increase in the "type unknown" category, which, according to their definition, comprises cases in which vCJD could be excluded. The total of 26 cases for the current year (2007) is disturbing, possibly symptomatic of the circulation of novel agents. Characterization of these agents should be given a high priority. - Mod.CP]
http://pro-med.blogspot.com/2007/11/proahedr-prion-disease-update-2007-07.html
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/askus/f?p=2400:1001:6833194127530602005::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1010,39963
There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.
He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf
JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY
MARCH 26, 2003
RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States
Email Terry S. Singeltary:
flounder@wt.net
I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?
http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535
THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN
Hardcover, 304 pages plus photos and illustrations. ISBN 0-387-95508-9
June 2003
BY Philip Yam
CHAPTER 14 LAYING ODDS
Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under- counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population.
http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.
Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex
1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL TEXT
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
2 January 2000 British Medical Journal U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117
15 November 1999 British Medical Journal vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
USDA CERTIFIED DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM for children
please note, dead stock downer cattle i.e. non-ambulatory, are the most likely to have mad cow disease.
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/02/transcript-technical-briefing.html
see full text 18 pages ;
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08686t.pdf
Thu Dec 6, 2007 11:38
FDA IN CRISIS MODE, AMERICAN LIVES AT RISK
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/fs/food-disease/news/dec0407fda.html
FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b_02_01_FDA%20Report%20on%20Science%20and%20Technology.pdf
[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle 9/13/2005
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_ $
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
Attachment to Singeltary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8152
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 Date: January 9, 2007 at 9:08 am PST
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f3412
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
APHIS-2006-0041-0006 TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Tuesday, June 3, 2008 SCRAPIE USA UPDATE JUNE 2008 NOR-98 REPORTED PA
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/scrapie-usa-update-june-2008-nor-98.html
NOR-98 ATYPICAL SCRAPIE 5 cases documented in USA in 5 different states USA 007
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/04/seac-spongiform-encephalopathy-advisory.html
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/
SCRAPIE USA
http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/
8. Human susceptibility to CWD
Millions of North Americans hunt deer and elk (U.S. Department of the Interior, Census Bureau), and there is no doubt that people have been exposed to CWD through venison consumption, particularly in light of recent data showing CWD prions in muscle [2]. Human susceptibility to CWD or to other newly emerging animal TSE [9, 14] is still unclear, although we can be somewhat reassured in that there have been no large scale outbreaks of human TSE cases in Colorado and Wyoming, where CWD has existed for decades [51]. Up until approximately 10 years ago, autopsies were not performed on suspect human TSE cases in many states due to biosafety concerns, therefore the diagnosis of potential new TSE strains has been hampered. This indicates that clinical TSE diagnoses in humans were not confirmed, nor was any strain typing done to look for the appearance of potentially subtle or unusual pathological or biochemical phenotypes of a new TSE strain. Fortunately, the autopsy rate for suspect cases is improving. At the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center at Case Western Reserve University (Cleveland, Ohio), Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) suspect cases are studied and classified by CJD subtype. Thus far,
*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported to the Surveillance Center***,
however there have been no unusual or novel prion subtypes that might indicate the appearance of a new prion strain [7, 41]. Other indirect studies of human susceptibility to CWD also suggest that the risk is low. In biochemical conversion studies, Raymond et al. [68] showed that the efficiency of CWD to convert recombinant human PrP into amyloid fibrils was low, but similar to that of both BSE and scrapie fibrils to do the same. These results suggest that there is a molecular incompatibility in the conversion of human PrPC by CWD, sheep scrapie, or BSE, and that cross species infections in humans may be rare events. To determine whether common PrPSc strain features may link CWD and CJD, histopathology and the PrPSc biochemical characteristics from deer and elk were compared with that of humans with sporadic CJD (sCJD) cases that are methionine homozygous at codon 129 of the Prnp gene by Xie et al. [96], although strain features including histologic profile, target organs, and glycoform patterns will not necessarily remain the same upon crossing species barriers [6, 5, 8, 57]. The PrPSc form is cleaved by proteinase-K (PK) at different sites depending on the conformation of the protein and may aid determination of whether the PrPSc conformation is similar. By western blot (SDS-PAGE) of elk CWD, the unglycosylated PK-resistant PrPSc migrated at 21 kDa, similar to sCJD (MM1 subtype) and the PK cleavage site was the same, occurring at residues 78 and 82 as assessed by N-terminal sequencing. Conformational stability was evaluated by measuring the PrPSc stability under partially denaturing conditions and also showed no significant difference between elk CWD and sCJD MM1 PrPSc. However, elk CWD and human sCJD MM1 strains exhibited distinct glycoform patterns by two dimensional gel electrophoresis, suggesting that the strains differed. Future studies may utilize luminescent conjugated polymers, which were recently shown to distinguish naturally- and experimentally-derived prion strains [79]. To study elk-human prion species barriers, Kong et al. inoculated elk CWD into transgenic mice expressing either human PrP or elk PrP. Whereas the elk PrP expressing mice developed disease after only 118-142 days post-inoculation, human PrP expressing mice (129M) did not develop any features of TSE after more than 657 or more than 756 days [41]. In accordance with these results, Tamgüney et al. also reported that human PrP overexpressing mice were not susceptible to 9 CWD isolates from mule deer, white-tailed deer, and elk [84]. However, mice have a limited lifespan and further passages may be necessary to detect low levels of prion infectivity that may be present subclinically. Although indirect evidence is accumulating that there may be a robust species barrier for CWD transmission to humans, one report indicates nonhuman primate susceptibility to CWD. Intracerebral inoculation of squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) demonstrated a positive CWD transmission [49]. Among non-human primates, however, the Prnp sequence of the new world monkeys are the most distant from humans [72], and therefore may not indicate that human prion conversion would occur by CWD.
snip...
11. Disease control challenges posed by CWD
Evidence is building that indicates efficient horizontal transmission occurs in CWD, indeed a complicating aspect in disease control [91]. Potential transmission mechanisms range from spread via direct contact among animals to environmental exposure through grazing in areas contaminated by prion-infected secretions, excretions (saliva, urine, feces), tissues (placenta), or decomposed carcasses. Recently, in a breakthrough finding, saliva from CWD infected deer was shown to transmit prion disease [50]. An additional experiment by Miller and colleagues showed that CWD-infected carcasses allowed to decay naturally in confined pastures can lead to CWD infections in captive deer, demonstrating the potential for environmental contamination to spread infection [55]. Modelling studies have provided further
support that environmental contamination is likely playing a significant role in transmitting CWD [56, 53]. Additionally, infectious prions have been demonstrated to bind soil particles and remain infectious to animals by both intracerebral and oral exposure routes [38, 37]. Prion infectivity has been recovered from soil more than two years after experimental exposure to prions, suggesting the soil may serve as a reservoir for CWD prions [75]. Taken together, these results indicate that there may even be multiple sources for CWD exposure, perhaps through direct contact and environmental routes. Significant challenges to CWD eradication exist in free-ranging cervids. Infected deer and elk range over a broad geographic region, and even previously surmised geographic barriers such as the Continental Divide have proven passable by infected animals. Ridding the environment of CWD-contaminated soil or even CWD-infected carcasses is not possible. Moreover, the available ante-mortem diagnostic tests for surveillance are laborious and impractical for large numbers of free-ranging animals [74, 88, 95]. Therefore for a wildlife manager, this disease is costly to survey and difficult to control.
12. Conclusion
CWD in cervids is efficiently transmitted, likely more than any other TSE in animals or humans. Therefore, it is unlikely that this TSE can be eradicated, but perhaps through an improved understanding of transmission routes, biological factors influencing pathogenesis, and the molecular basis of CWD prion conversion, a targeted strategy for interrupting disease spread may be developed.
Acknowledgements
I thank Drs. Michael Miller, Jason Bartz and Mathias Heikenwalder for critical review of the manuscript.
snip...see full text 19 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v08092.pdf
SEE FULL TEXT CWD ;
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/04/prion-disease-of-cervids-chronic.html
Thursday, April 03, 2008
A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/04/prion-disease-of-cervids-chronic.html
Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME
http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
Interference at the EPA - Science and Politics at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
please see full text ;
http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/
Greetings again Honorable President Young-hui, KIWA (Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance), and all Korea,
You might want to communicate these factors of iCJD to your fellow Koreans in the USA who are having medical, surgical and or dental work done. With the many different animal TSEs in the USA of typical and atypical phenotype, the consumption thereof of these TSE infected animals, and the following medical, surgical, and or dental work done on any individual consuming such tainted product, the fact that Koreans are more susceptible to contracting a TSE, one must ponder all these factors ;
Polymorphisms of the prion protein gene (PRNP) in a Korean population Journal Journal of Human Genetics Publisher Springer Japan ISSN 1434-5161 (Print) 1435-232X (Online) Issue Volume 49, Number 6 / June, 2004 Category Short Communication DOI 10.1007/s10038-004-0150-7 Pages 319-324 Subject Collection Biomedical and Life Sciences SpringerLink Date Monday, May 17, 2004
Byung-Hoon Jeong1, Jae-Hwan Nam2, Yun-Jung Lee1, Kyung-Hee Lee1, Myoung-Kuk Jang1, Richard I. Carp3, Ho-Dong Lee2, Young-Ran Ju2, Sangmee Ahn Jo2, Keun-Yong Park2 and Yong-Sun Kim1, 4
(1) Ilsong Institute of Life Science, Hallym University, Ilsong Building, 1605-4, Gwanyang-dong, Dongan-gu, Anyang, Kyounggi-do, 431-060, South Korea (2) Department of Virology, Korea National Institute of Health, Eunpyung-gu, Seoul, 122-701, South Korea (3) New York State Institute for Basic Research in Developmental Disabilities, Staten Island, NY 10314, USA (4) Department of Microbiology, College of Medicine, Hallym University, 1605-4, Gwanyang-dong, Dongan-gu, Anyang, Kyounggi-do, 431-060, South Korea
Received: 7 January 2004 Accepted: 5 March 2004 Published online: 18 May 2004
Abstract Human prion protein gene (PRNP) has been considered to be involved in the susceptibility of humans to prion diseases. Polymorphisms of methionine (Met)/valine (Val) at codon 129 and of glutamic acid (Glu)/lysine (Lys) at codon 219 are thought to play an important role in susceptibility to sporadic, iatrogenic and variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD). Although the genotype distribution of polymorphisms in PRNP open reading frame (ORF) has been reported in many European populations, among Asian groups, it has been reported only in the Japanese population. We examined the PRNP polymorphisms in 529 healthy Koreans. We observed that genotype frequencies at codon 129 was 94.33% Met/Met, 5.48% Met/Val, and 0.19% Val/Val with an allele frequency of 0.971:0.029 Met:Val, and that genotype frequencies at codon 219 was 92.06% Glu/Glu, 7.94% Glu/Lys, and 0% Lys/Lys with an allele frequency of 0.96:0.04 Glu:Lys. The frequencies of the Glu/Glu genotype (2=10.075, P=0.0015) and of the Glu allele (2=9.486, P=0.0021) at codon 219 were significantly higher in the Korean population than the Japanese population. In addition, the genotype frequency of heterozygotes (12.7%) at codons 129 or/and 219 was significantly lower in Koreans than in people from Great Britain (2=89.52, P<0.0001).
European Journal of Human Genetics (2005) 13, 1094–1097. doi:10.1038/sj.ejhg.5201460; published online 29 June 2005
Polymorphism at 3' UTR +28 of the prion-like protein gene is associated with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease Byung-Hoon Jeong1, Nam-Ho Kim1, Eun-Kyoung Choi1, Chaeyoung Lee1, Young-Han Song1, Jae-Il Kim2, Richard I Carp2 and Yong-Sun Kim1,3
1Ilsong Institute of Life Science, Hallym University, 1605-4 Gwanyang-dong
snip...
Our results are the first genetic association study of the PRND noncoding region with sporadic CJD. Recently, we reported that the distributions of codons 129 and 219 genotypes of PRNP in a Korean population differ significantly from those reported for other ethnic groups.24 Thus, further investigations in different ethnic groups including Europeans will be necessary to assess association between sporadic CJD and the PRND 3' UTR +28 polymorphism. Furthermore, since it is unknown whether this polymorphism affects mRNA stability or gene expression of PRND, further experiments should be conducted to clarify the role of this polymorphism in PRND function.
http://www.nature.com/ejhg/journal/v13/n9/full/5201460a.html
iatrogenic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease
Reports of incidents of potential iatrogenic exposure to CJD via surgery: 01 January 2000 to 31 Dec 2007
There were a total of 329 incidents reported during this period (table 1). Eleven surgical incidents were reported between 1 July and 31 December 2007 (since the previous update report). A surgical incident occurs when a patient undergoes surgery but is only identified as having CJD or being at risk of CJD at a later date. This means that the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) transmissible spongiform encephalopathy working group infection control guidelines would not have been followed. The surgery carried out on an index patient with, or at risk of, CJD may result in contamination of the instruments with abnormal prion protein. Table 1 shows the number of CJD surgical incidents reported to the CJD Incidents Panel from January 2000 to December 2007 by the diagnosis of the index patient.
Table 1 CJD Surgical Incidents (n=329) reported to the CJD Incidents Panel, by diagnosis of index patient: January 2000 to Dec 2007
snip... see full text ;
http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpr/infections/ei_cjd.htm#cjd
Wednesday, January 02, 2008 Risk factors for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Wednesday, January 02, 2008 Risk factors for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
FURTHER INTO THIS STUDY ;
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/risk-factors-for-sporadic-creutzfeldt.html
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2007/12/risk-factors-for-sporadic-creutzfeldt.html
Monday, December 31, 2007 Risk Assessment of Transmission of Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in Endodontic Practice in Absence of Adequate Prion Inactivation
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2007/12/risk-assessment-of-transmission-of.html
Wednesday, June 4, 2008
SEAC 2008 ONE HUNDREDTH MEETING OF THE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
http://seac992007.blogspot.com/2008/06/seac-2008-one-hundredth-meeting-of.html
summary
In summary, although this young woman clearly died of a prion disease, we could not conclude she had vCJD, but also we could not be sure this was sporadic CJD either. Although we were not able to make definite conclusions on the basis of a single patient, we felt it important to report this tragic death and these findings in the medical literature so as to bring this to the attention of other doctors who might see similar patients in the future. This unusual finding reminds us of the importance of keeping alert to the possibility that BSE prions will cause disease in individuals with different genetic types, who may develop a disease that may resemble sporadic CJD, or vCJD, or have a new pattern of disease. This work emphasises the importance of continuing to study the rogue prion protein type in patients and we thank all patients and families who have kindly consented to use their, or their loved one’s, tissues for this medical research.
Reference: Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Prion Protein Gene Codon 129VV, and a Novel PrPSc Type in a Young British Woman Simon Mead; Susan Joiner; Melanie Desbruslais; Jonathan A. Beck; Michael O’ Donoghue; Peter Lantos; Jonathan D. F. Wadsworth; John Collinge Arch Neurol. 2007;64(12):1780-1784.
www.cjdsupport.net Newsletter issue 17 april 2008
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Prion Protein Gene Codon 129VV, and a Novel PrPSc ype in a Young British Woman
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-prion-protein.html
And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.
full text 18 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf
Thursday, June 05, 2008
Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been *** revised *** to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
SIGN THE PETITION TODAY, it may be the only recourse for the USA consumer to finally get USA beef tested for BSE. We must stand together and demand a safer BSE free beef product
http://www.stopmadcow.org/
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
KS-73 (Apr 23, 2008)
Asterisks (*) indicate the most recent revision to these requirements. To search, click on your browser's "Edit" menu, then click on "Find (on this page)". Enter "*" in the "Find What" field, then click "Find" or "Find Next" until all asterisks have been identified.
Eligible/Ineligible Products
Eligible product
Although the United States and Korea have reached general agreement on the resumption of export of U.S. beef and beef products to Korea, FSIS officials should not issue export certificates for beef and beef products intended for export to Korea at this time. Additional information about the specific conditions, including eligible product, plant approval, and certification requirements are being developed and will be made available as soon as possible. Establishment management may contact AMS at 540-361-7640 for information about AMS program requirements.*
snip...end
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/regulations_&_policies/Republic_of_Korea_Requirements/index.asp
Greetings,
please see the 'meat of the issue' on import health requirements for the U.S. beef and beef products to Korea, or the lack of, as follows ;
IMPORT HEALTH REQUIREMENTS FOR U.S. BEEF AND BEEF PRODUCTS
Import Health Requirements for U.S. Beef and Beef Products
The following import health requirements shall be applied to beef and beef products exported from the United States of America ("United States") to the Republic of Korea ("Korea").
Definitions
1. Definitions for the purpose of these health requirements are as follows:
(1) "Beef or beef products" includes all edible parts of cattle less than 30 months of age at the time of slaughter and products derived from all edible parts of cattle less than 30 months of age at the time of slaughter as described in the U.S. Federal Meat Inspection Act. However, "beef or beef products" excludes specified risk materials (SRMs); all mechanically recovered meat (MRM)/mechanically separated meat (MSM); and advanced meat recovery product (AMR) from the skull and vertebral column of cattle 30 months of age and over at the time of slaughter. AMR that is free of SRMs and central nervous system tissues (CNS) is allowed. Ground meat, processed products and beef extracts may contain AMR but excludes specified risk materials (SRMs) and all MRM/MSM.
(2) "BSE" means Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy.
(3) "Cattle" means domesticated bovine animals (Bos taurus and Bos indicus) born and raised in the United States, legally imported into the United States from a country deemed eligible by the Korean government to export beef or beef products to Korea, or raised in the United States for at least 100 days prior to slaughter.
(4) "Food-safety hazard" means any biological, chemical, or physical property that may cause food to be unsafe for human consumption.
(5) "Lot" means a quantity of beef or beef products identified on a single export certificate from one meat establishment, and consists of the same process category and product standard of identity (sub-category).
(6) "Meat establishment" includes any slaughterhouse, processing plant, and storage facility for beef or beef products that operates under U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) inspection.
(7) "Non-compliance" means an inconsistency with this protocol that does not constitute a food-safety hazard.
(8) "Serious non-compliance" means a food-safety hazard in a shipped product or a food-safety hazard found during a system audit.
(9) "Specified risk materials" (SRMs) means:
(a) tonsils and distal ileum from cattle of all ages; and
(b) brain, eyes, spinal cord, skull, dorsal root ganglia (DRG) and vertebral column (excluding vertebrae of the tail, transverse processes and spinous processes of the cervical, thoracic and lumbar vertebrae, median crest and wings of the sacrum) from cattle 30 months of age and over at the time of slaughter.(10) "United States" (U.S.) means the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
General Requirements
2. Prior to the loading of the beef or beef products:
(a) the United States has been free of foot-and-mouth disease for the past 12 months and has been free of rinderpest, contagious bovine pleuropneumonia, lumpy skin disease and Rift Valley fever for the past 24 months; and
(b) Vaccination has not been carried out against the aforementioned diseases.
Notwithstanding the above, in the event the Korean government recognizes that effective stamping-out policies ar e in place for the specific disease in the United States, including emergency vaccination if carried out, the required period for recognizing the United States as being free of that disease may be shortened in accordance with World Organization for Animal Health (OlE) guidelines after Korea conducts a risk analysis.
3. In the event a disease set out in item 2 occurs in the United States, the U.S. government shall immediately suspend the issuance of export certificates for all beef and beef products to Korea that do not meet the requirements of item 2.
4. The U.S. government, in accordance with U.S. regulations, continuously maintains measures that meet or exceed OlE guidelines for controlled-risk status to effectively detect and prevent the introduction and spread of BSE. The U.S. government will provide notice to the World Trade Organization (WTO) -according to its WTO commitments -and inform Korea regarding the repeal or amendment of any BSE-related measure.
5. In the event (an) additional case(s) of BSE occur(s) in the United States, the U.S. government shall immediately conduct a thorough epidemiological investigation and inform the Korean government of the results of the investigation. The U.S. government will consult with the Korean government about the findings of the investigation. The Korean government will suspend the importation of beef and beef products if the additional case(s) results in the OlE recognizing an adverse change in the classification of the U.S. BSE status.
Requirements for Meat Establishments
6. Any meat establishment in the United States that operates under USDA inspection is eligible to produce beef or beef products for Korea. The establishment should be notified to the Korean government in advance.
7. The U.S. government will maintain a regular monitoring and aUditing program for meat establishments that produce beef or beef products for export to Korea to ensure they comply with the relevant provisions of these health requirements and U.S. regulations. In the event of a serious non-compliance, the Food Safely and Inspection Service (FSIS) personnel would issue a Noncompliance Record and would immediately control the non-compliant product If the process that resulted in the non-compliant product is on-going, FSIS would immediately stop the process until it determines tha t appropriate corrective and preventative measures have been taken. Only when FSIS determines that corrective actions are adequate will production be allowed to resume. The U.S. government will inform the Korean government if an establishment is suspended and when corrective action has been taken.
8. The Korean government may conduct on-site aUdits of a representative sample of the meat establishments that export beef or beef products to Korea. When a serious non-compliance with these health requirements has been found as a result of the on-site audit, the Korean government will inform the results to the U.S. government, and the U.S. government shall take appropriate measures and inform the Korean government of the measures taken.
9. The U.S. government shall verify that a suspended meat establishment has determined and implemented appropriate corrective and preventative measures before lifting the suspension described in item 7, item B or item 24. The U.S. government shall inform the Korean government of the corrective action the meat establishment has taken and of the date the meat establishmenfs suspension is lifted.
Requirements for Beef and Beef Products
10. The beef or beef products were derived from cattle born and raised in the United States, from cattle legally imported into the United States from a country deemed eligible by the Korean government to export beef or beef products to Korea, or from cattle raised in the United States for at least 100 days prior to slaughter.
11. Cattle for producing beef or beef products for export were not suspect or confirmed BSE cases; confirmed progenies of BSE cases; or confirmed cohorts of BSE cases, as defined in the Terrestrial Animal Health Code adopted by the OlE.
12. Meat establishments that produce beef or beef products shall maintain a program for the hygienic removal of SRMs.
13. For the purpose of SRM removal, the age of cattle at the time of slaughter was verified by documentation which identifies the age or by dentition.
14. The meat establishments maintain purchase records indicating the facility from which the animals were purchased for slaughter. Records may be disposed of two years after the date of purchase.
15. The beef or beef products were derived from cattle that were slaughtered in meat establishments (slaughterhouses) certified by th e U.S. government as eligible to export beef and beef products to Korea and that passed ante-mortem and post-mortem inspection conducted by USDA inspection personnel under the supervision of the resident USDA veterinarian.
16. The beef or beef products were derived from cattle that were not subjected to a stunning process, prior to slaughter, with a device injecting compressed air or gas into the cranial cavity, or to a pithing process.
17. The beef or beef products were produced and handled in a manner as to prevent contamination from SRMs or from MSM from the skull and vertebral column of cattle 30 months of age and over, in accordance with FSIS regulations.
18. Residues (radioactivity, synthetic antibiotic sUbstances, antibiotic substances, heavy metals, pesticides, hormones, etc.) posing a public health hazard and pathogenic microorganisms in the beef and beef products shall not exceed the tolerance levels established by the Korean government. The beef and beef products may be treated with ionizing radiation, ultraviolet rays, and tenderizers in accordance with Korean regUlations.
19. Sanitary packaging material was used to package the beef or beef products.
20. The processing, storage and transportation of the beef an d beef products were handled in such a manner as to prevent contamination by communicable animal disease pathogens.
21. Refrigerated or cold storage rooms on a ship (aircraft) or container that transports the beef and beef products were sealed by using the seal of the U.S. government or a U.S. government-recognized seal and then certified by a U.S. government veterinarian.
Export Certificate
22. Beef and beef products qualify for import quarantine inspection if accompanied by the Export Certificate of Wholesomeness and the Certificate for Export of Beef and Beef Products to the Republic of Korea (ROK) issued by the veterinary authority of the U.S. government, which include the following information to be submitted to the quarantine authority of the Korean government:
(1) Information responsive to items 2,10 and 15-20 above;
(2) Name of the product (including species), number of packages and weight (net weight) listed by each final processing plant;
(3) Names, addresses and establishment numbers of the slaughterhouse, meat processing plant and storage facility;
(4) Slaughtering period and/or processing period (dd/mmJyy-dd/mm/yy);
(5) Names and addresses of the consignor and the consignee;
(6) Date the export certificate was issued and the name and signature of the issuer; and
(7) Container number and seal number.
Import Quarantine Inspection and Regulatory Action
23. If the Korean government detects a food-safety hazard in a lot during the quarantine inspection process, it may reject the lot. The Korean government shall notify and consult with the U.S. government regarding the matter and may request corrective action if appropriate. If an SRM is found, FSIS will conduct an investigation to determine the cause of the problem. Product pro duced by the pertinent me at establishment shall continue to be eligible for import quarantine inspection. However, the Korean government will increase the rate of inspection of subsequent beef and beef products from the meat establishment. After the Korean government inspects five lots of equal or greater quantity of the same product wnhout finding a food-safety hazard, the Korean government shall apply its standard inspection procedures and rates.
24. If the Korean government observes at least two incidents of food-safety hazards involving separate lots from the same meat establishment, the meat establishment may be suspended until corrective action has been taken. Beef and beef products of the meat establishment that were certified prior to the date of suspension shall continue to be eligible for import quarantine inspection. An establishment shall remain suspended until the U.S. government verifies to the Korean government that corrective actions have been completed. The U.S. government shall inform the Korean government of the meat establishment's corrective action and of the date the meat establishmenfs suspension is lifted. The Korean government may include an on-site audit of the establishment during its next system audit in the United States.
Consultations
25. The Korean government or the U.S. government may request consultations with the other concerning any matter regarding the interpretation or application of these import health requirements. Unless otherwise agreed, the consultations shall be held within seven days of the request in the territory of the government that receives the request.
Addendum
1. This notice will go into effect on the date of its notification.
2. When the United States publicly announces its enhanced feed ban, Article 1(1) shall be modified to read as follows: "beef or beef products" includes all edible parts of cattle and products derived from all edible parts of cattle as described in the U.S. Federal Meat Inspection Act. However, "beef or beef products" excludes specified risk materials (SRMs); all mechanically recovered meat (MRM) /mechanically separated meat (MSM); and advanced meat recovery product (AMR) from the skull and vertebral column of cattle 30 months of age and over at the time of slaughter. AMR that is free of SRMs and central nervous system tissues (CNS) is allowed. Ground meat, processed products and beef extracts may contain AMR but excludes specified risk materials (SRMs) and all MRM/MSM.
3. During the first 90 days following the effective date of these import health requirements, Korea may audit and/or reject U.S. decisions regarding the listing of new plants or re-Iisting of previously de-listed plants.
4. During the first 180 days following the effective date of these import health requirements, exports of T-bone and Porterhouse steaks will be accompanied by some notation on the box that confirms for Korean officials that these cuts of beef come from cattle under 30 months of age. The Korean government and the U.S. government agree to have consultations upon the completion of the 180 day period with a view to addressing concerns after reviewing the notation's effect on beef trade and its inspection.
Min Dong-Seck
Deputy Minister
MIFAFF
On behalf of Korea
A. Ellen Terpstra
Deputy Under Secretary
USDA
On behalf of the United States
http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/import_requirements_eng_both_sign.pdf
Why Americans, As Well as Koreans, Should Be Worried About Mad Cow Tainted USA Beef
By Terry S. Singeltary Sr. May 15, 2008
Straight to the Source
Web Note: This is an important commentary by Terry S. Singeltary Sr., on a recent Business Week story on the controversy in South Korea over their government's lifting on the ban on conventional (non-organic) beef, despite the fact that the USDA is still allowing slaughterhouse waste and blood and manure to be fed to cows, and refusing to test all cows at slaughter. See the Mad Cow section of the OCA website for in-depth information. Terry is a regular blogger on the OCA website on Mad Cow issues.
Ronnie Cummins
One Korean official says the probability of a human being catching a mad cow disease by eating U.S. beef is like the one of a golf player scoring a hole-in-one and then being killed by lightning.
this is typical BSe. you here industry groups comment 'your more likely to get hit by a car than die from CJD'. well, maybe so, but my mother and many more did not die from getting hit by a car, they died from CJD, my mothers being the hvCJD (confirmed), and my neighbors mother died from CJD (confirmed). the UKBSEnvCJD _only_ theory is incorrect. there are more strains of mad cow than the UK BSE in beef to nvCJD in humans in the UK. The deception by the USDA, FDA, and the Bush administration about mad cow disease, CJD, and all Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathy over the past 8 years have been outrageous, to a point of being criminal. I am vested in nothing, but the truth.
snip...see full text ;
http://www.grassrootsnetroots.org/articles/article_12387.cfm
Tuesday, May 13, 2008
Concerned Americans against Mad Cow Disease STATEMENT OF SOLIDARITY with Koreans May 13, 2008
http://usdavskorea.blogspot.com/2008/05/concerned-americans-against-mad-cow.html
http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/concerned-americans-against-mad-cow-disease-statement-of-solidarity-with-koreans-may-13-2008.html
http://www.koreantopnews.com/story.php?title=USDA_VS_KOREA_typical_or_atypical_BSe_Concerned_Americans_against_Mad_Cow_Disease_STATEMENT_OF_SOLIDARITY_with_Koreans_May_13_2008
BSE YOUNGEST AGE STATISTICS UNDER 30 MONTHS
http://bseyoungestage.blogspot.com/
http://flounder068.vox.com/library/post/bse-youngest-age-statistics-under-30-months.html
Tuesday, May 27, 2008
FDA BSE/Ruminant Feed Inspections Firms Inventory Report Texas Legend Ranch OAI 05/10/2008
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/05/fda-bseruminant-feed-inspections-firms.html
"South Korea may demand revision of US beef import pact"
"The agreement, struck last month, has been widely criticized as making too"
"many concessions to the United States"
THE PEOPLE of Korea _should_ be mad about the importing of USA beef into their Country. can you believe these regulations? even IF a BSE case(s) are documented in the USA, the people of Korea still cannot suspend the importing of U.S. beef, NO matter how many more mad cows the USA finds, until a thorough epidemiological investigation is finished. please remember, it took over a year and literally an act of congress to confirm the atypical mad cow in Texas before they finally finish that epidemiological investigation, and even after all that, the Koreans still cannot ban USA beef, until the OIE recognizes an adverse change in the classification of the U.S. BSE status. Considering the USDA and the OIE collaborated to seal the deal of the BSE MRR policy (the legal trading of all strains of TSE globally, just for commodities and futures sake, human health was not even considered), I doubt the OIE would ever change the BSE status for the USA, no matter how many more mad cows are found. It's all about money folks.
WE are talking years now, before the Koreans could ever suspend USA beef due to a BSE case(s) ever being documented in the USA, due to these stupid regulations. This is nothing more than FORCE FEEDING KOREA USDA MAD COW BEEF, i.e. all for a dollar, to hell with human health on a disease with an incubation period of years if not a decade or more.
Please remember, the last two mad cows documented in the USA i.e. Alabama and Texas, both were of the 'atypical' BSE strain, and immediately after that, the USDA shut down the testing from 470,000 to 40,000 in the U.S. in 2007 out of about 35 million cattle slaughtered. also, science is showing that some of these atypical cases are more virulent to humans than the typical UK BSE strain ;
***Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.***
Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center
An Update from Stephen M. Sergay, MB, BCh & Pierluigi Gambetti, MD
April 3, 2008
http://www.aan.com/news/?event=read&article_id=4397&page=72.45.45
IF BSE is not in the USA (just not documented for many different reasons), and only atypical BSE is in the USA (plus CWD, plus, many strains of Scrapie, and Now the Nor-98 documented in 5 different states, plus TME, then why would human mad cow in the USA look like the UK nvCJD from UK BSE cows ? it was shown long ago in studies at Mission Texas that experimental transmission of USA Scrapie to USA Bovine, DID NOT LOOK LIKE UK BSE. so again, in short, why would human mad cow in the USA look like human mad cow in the UK i.e. the (nvCJD). however, I believe that BSE has been in the USA untested and undocumented for years. why on earth then does the USDA refuse to allow creekstone or anyone else test their product? simple, if you don't look/test, you don't find.
ONE only has to read how the USDA et al have legally blocked, blundered, botched, mismanaged, bungled, floundered, and flat out manipulated, the testing in the infamous June 2004 enhanced cover-up program for mad cow surveillance and testing. I mean, I am not really to hip on THE INDUSTRY, testing for mad cow disease, and what that program might consist of, but anything is better than nothing at all. ...
BSE BASE MAD COW TESTING TEXAS, USA, AND CANADA
http://madcowtesting.blogspot.com/
MAD COW DISEASE terminology UK c-BSE (typical), atypical BSE H or L, and or Italian L-BASE
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/03/mad-cow-disease-terminology-uk-c-bse.html
In 2007, in one weekly enforcement report, the fda recalled 10,000,000+ pounds of BANNED MAD COW FEED, 'in commerce', and i can tell you that most of it was fed out ;
10,000,000+ LBS. of PROHIBITED BANNED MAD COW FEED I.E. MBM IN COMMERCE USA 2007
Date: March 21, 2007 at 2:27 pm PST REASON Blood meal used to make cattle feed was recalled because it was cross-contaminated with prohibited bovine meat and bone meal that had been manufactured on common equipment and labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 42,090 lbs. DISTRIBUTION WI
REASON Products manufactured from bulk feed containing blood meal that was cross contaminated with prohibited meat and bone meal and the labeling did not bear cautionary BSE statement. VOLUME OF PRODUCT IN COMMERCE 9,997,976 lbs. DISTRIBUTION ID and NV
END OF ENFORCEMENT REPORT FOR MARCH 21, 2007
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/enforce/2007/ENF00996.html
Subject: MAD COW FEED RECALL USA SEPT 6, 2006 1961.72 TONS IN COMMERCE AL, TN, AND WV Date: September 6, 2006 at 7:58 am PST
snip... see listings and references of enormous amounts of banned mad cow protein 'in commerce' in 2006 and 2005 ;
see full text ;
Friday, April 25, 2008
Substances Prohibited From Use in Animal Food or Feed [Docket No. 2002N-0273] (Formerly Docket No. 02N-0273) RIN 0910-AF46
http://madcowfeed.blogspot.com/2008/04/substances-prohibited-from-use-in.html
SPECIFIED RISK MATERIALS
http://madcowspontaneousnot.blogspot.com/2008/02/specified-risk-materials-srm.html
SRM MAD COW RECALL 406 THOUSAND POUNDS CATTLE HEADS WITH TONSILS KANSAS
http://cjdmadcowbaseoct2007.blogspot.com/2008/04/srm-mad-cow-recall-406-thousand-pounds.html
Sunday, April 20, 2008 Progress Report from the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center April 3, 2008
Atypical forms of BSE have emerged which, although rare, appear to be more virulent than the classical BSE that causes vCJD.
see full text ;
http://prionunitusaupdate2008.blogspot.com/2008/04/progress-report-from-national-prion.html
CJD TEXAS (cjd clusters)
http://cjdtexas.blogspot.com/
CJD USA RISING
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been revised to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
Communicated by: Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
[In submitting these data, Terry S. Singeltary Sr. draws attention to the steady increase in the "type unknown" category, which, according to their definition, comprises cases in which vCJD could be excluded. The total of 26 cases for the current year (2007) is disturbing, possibly symptomatic of the circulation of novel agents. Characterization of these agents should be given a high priority. - Mod.CP]
http://pro-med.blogspot.com/2007/11/proahedr-prion-disease-update-2007-07.html
http://www.promedmail.org/pls/askus/f?p=2400:1001:6833194127530602005::NO::F2400_P1001_BACK_PAGE,F2400_P1001_PUB_MAIL_ID:1010,39963
There is a growing number of human CJD cases, and they were presented last week in San Francisco by Luigi Gambatti(?) from his CJD surveillance collection.
He estimates that it may be up to 14 or 15 persons which display selectively SPRPSC and practically no detected RPRPSC proteins.
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/1006-4240t1.htm
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/06/transcripts/2006-4240t1.pdf
JOURNAL OF NEUROLOGY
MARCH 26, 2003
RE-Monitoring the occurrence of emerging forms of Creutzfeldt-Jakob
disease in the United States
Email Terry S. Singeltary:
flounder@wt.net
I lost my mother to hvCJD (Heidenhain Variant CJD). I would like to comment on the CDC's attempts to monitor the occurrence of emerging forms of CJD. Asante, Collinge et al [1] have reported that BSE transmission to the 129-methionine genotype can lead to an alternate phenotype that is indistinguishable from type 2 PrPSc, the commonest sporadic CJD. However, CJD and all human TSEs are not reportable nationally. CJD and all human TSEs must be made reportable in every state and internationally. I hope that the CDC does not continue to expect us to still believe that the 85%+ of all CJD cases which are sporadic are all spontaneous, without route/source. We have many TSEs in the USA in both animal and man. CWD in deer/elk is spreading rapidly and CWD does transmit to mink, ferret, cattle, and squirrel monkey by intracerebral inoculation. With the known incubation periods in other TSEs, oral transmission studies of CWD may take much longer. Every victim/family of CJD/TSEs should be asked about route and source of this agent. To prolong this will only spread the agent and needlessly expose others. In light of the findings of Asante and Collinge et al, there should be drastic measures to safeguard the medical and surgical arena from sporadic CJDs and all human TSEs. I only ponder how many sporadic CJDs in the USA are type 2 PrPSc?
http://www.neurology.org/cgi/eletters/60/2/176#535
THE PATHOLOGICAL PROTEIN
Hardcover, 304 pages plus photos and illustrations. ISBN 0-387-95508-9
June 2003
BY Philip Yam
CHAPTER 14 LAYING ODDS
Answering critics like Terry Singeltary, who feels that the U.S. under- counts CJD, Schonberger conceded that the current surveillance system has errors but stated that most of the errors will be confined to the older population.
http://www.thepathologicalprotein.com/
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease Singeltary, Sr et al. JAMA.2001; 285: 733-734. Vol. 285 No. 6, February 14, 2001 JAMA
Diagnosis and Reporting of Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease
To the Editor: In their Research Letter, Dr Gibbons and colleagues1 reported that the annual US death rate due to Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) has been stable since 1985. These estimates, however, are based only on reported cases, and do not include misdiagnosed or preclinical cases. It seems to me that misdiagnosis alone would drastically change these figures. An unknown number of persons with a diagnosis of Alzheimer disease in fact may have CJD, although only a small number of these patients receive the postmortem examination necessary to make this diagnosis. Furthermore, only a few states have made CJD reportable. Human and animal transmissible spongiform encephalopathies should be reportable nationwide and internationally.
Terry S. Singeltary, Sr Bacliff, Tex
1. Gibbons RV, Holman RC, Belay ED, Schonberger LB. Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease in the United States: 1979-1998. JAMA. 2000;284:2322-2323. FREE FULL TEXT
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/extract/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/285/6/733?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=singeltary&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT
2 January 2000 British Medical Journal U.S. Scientist should be concerned with a CJD epidemic in the U.S., as well
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/320/7226/8/b#6117
15 November 1999 British Medical Journal vCJD in the USA * BSE in U.S.
http://www.bmj.com/cgi/eletters/319/7220/1312/b#5406
Over the next 8-10 weeks, approximately 40% of all the adult mink on the farm died from TME. Since previous incidences of TME were associated with common or shared feeding practices, we obtained a careful history of feed ingredients used over the past 12-18 months. The rancher was a "dead stock" feeder using mostly (>95%) downer or dead dairy cattle and a few horses. Sheep had never been fed.
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m09/tab05.pdf
USDA CERTIFIED DEAD STOCK DOWNER COW SCHOOL LUNCH PROGRAM for children
please note, dead stock downer cattle i.e. non-ambulatory, are the most likely to have mad cow disease.
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/
http://downercattle.blogspot.com/2008/02/transcript-technical-briefing.html
see full text 18 pages ;
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08686t.pdf
Thu Dec 6, 2007 11:38
FDA IN CRISIS MODE, AMERICAN LIVES AT RISK
http://www.cidrap.umn.edu/cidrap/content/fs/food-disease/news/dec0407fda.html
FDA SCIENCE AND MISSION AT RISK
http://www.fda.gov/ohrms/dockets/ac/07/briefing/2007-4329b_02_01_FDA%20Report%20on%20Science%20and%20Technology.pdf
[Docket No. 03-025IFA] FSIS Prohibition of the Use of Specified Risk Materials for Human Food and Requirement for the Disposition of Non-Ambulatory Disabled Cattle 9/13/2005
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/03-025IFA/03-025IFA-2.pdf
3. Prof. A. Robertson gave a brief account of BSE. The US approach was to accord it a _very low profile indeed_. Dr. A Thiermann showed the picture in the ''Independent'' with cattle being incinerated and thought this was a fanatical incident to be _avoided_ in the US _at all costs_ $
http://www.bseinquiry.gov.uk/files/mb/m11b/tab01.pdf
Attachment to Singeltary comment
January 28, 2007
Greetings APHIS,
I would kindly like to submit the following to ;
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01
[Federal Register: January 9, 2007 (Volume 72, Number 5)] [Proposed Rules] [Page 1101-1129] From the Federal Register Online via GPO Access [wais.access.gpo.gov] [DOCID:fr09ja07-21]
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f8152
BSE; MRR; IMPORTATION OF LIVE BOVINES AND PRODUCTS DERIVED FROM BOVINES [Docket No. APHIS-2006-0041] RIN 0579-AC01 Date: January 9, 2007 at 9:08 am PST
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/component/main?main=DocumentDetail&o=09000064801f3412
[Docket No. FSIS-2006-0011] FSIS Harvard Risk Assessment of Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE)
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/OPPDE/Comments/2006-0011/2006-0011-1.pdf
APHIS-2006-0041-0006 TSE advisory committee for the meeting December 15, 2006
http://www.regulations.gov/fdmspublic/ContentViewer?objectId=09000064801f3413&disposition=attachment&contentType=msw8
Tuesday, June 3, 2008 SCRAPIE USA UPDATE JUNE 2008 NOR-98 REPORTED PA
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/06/scrapie-usa-update-june-2008-nor-98.html
NOR-98 ATYPICAL SCRAPIE 5 cases documented in USA in 5 different states USA 007
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/2008/04/seac-spongiform-encephalopathy-advisory.html
http://nor-98.blogspot.com/
SCRAPIE USA
http://scrapie-usa.blogspot.com/
CHRONIC WASTING DISEASE
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/
8. Human susceptibility to CWD
Millions of North Americans hunt deer and elk (U.S. Department of the Interior, Census Bureau), and there is no doubt that people have been exposed to CWD through venison consumption, particularly in light of recent data showing CWD prions in muscle [2]. Human susceptibility to CWD or to other newly emerging animal TSE [9, 14] is still unclear, although we can be somewhat reassured in that there have been no large scale outbreaks of human TSE cases in Colorado and Wyoming, where CWD has existed for decades [51]. Up until approximately 10 years ago, autopsies were not performed on suspect human TSE cases in many states due to biosafety concerns, therefore the diagnosis of potential new TSE strains has been hampered. This indicates that clinical TSE diagnoses in humans were not confirmed, nor was any strain typing done to look for the appearance of potentially subtle or unusual pathological or biochemical phenotypes of a new TSE strain. Fortunately, the autopsy rate for suspect cases is improving. At the National Prion Disease Pathology Surveillance Center at Case Western Reserve University (Cleveland, Ohio), Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease (CJD) suspect cases are studied and classified by CJD subtype. Thus far,
*** twenty-seven CJD patients who regularly consumed venison were reported to the Surveillance Center***,
however there have been no unusual or novel prion subtypes that might indicate the appearance of a new prion strain [7, 41]. Other indirect studies of human susceptibility to CWD also suggest that the risk is low. In biochemical conversion studies, Raymond et al. [68] showed that the efficiency of CWD to convert recombinant human PrP into amyloid fibrils was low, but similar to that of both BSE and scrapie fibrils to do the same. These results suggest that there is a molecular incompatibility in the conversion of human PrPC by CWD, sheep scrapie, or BSE, and that cross species infections in humans may be rare events. To determine whether common PrPSc strain features may link CWD and CJD, histopathology and the PrPSc biochemical characteristics from deer and elk were compared with that of humans with sporadic CJD (sCJD) cases that are methionine homozygous at codon 129 of the Prnp gene by Xie et al. [96], although strain features including histologic profile, target organs, and glycoform patterns will not necessarily remain the same upon crossing species barriers [6, 5, 8, 57]. The PrPSc form is cleaved by proteinase-K (PK) at different sites depending on the conformation of the protein and may aid determination of whether the PrPSc conformation is similar. By western blot (SDS-PAGE) of elk CWD, the unglycosylated PK-resistant PrPSc migrated at 21 kDa, similar to sCJD (MM1 subtype) and the PK cleavage site was the same, occurring at residues 78 and 82 as assessed by N-terminal sequencing. Conformational stability was evaluated by measuring the PrPSc stability under partially denaturing conditions and also showed no significant difference between elk CWD and sCJD MM1 PrPSc. However, elk CWD and human sCJD MM1 strains exhibited distinct glycoform patterns by two dimensional gel electrophoresis, suggesting that the strains differed. Future studies may utilize luminescent conjugated polymers, which were recently shown to distinguish naturally- and experimentally-derived prion strains [79]. To study elk-human prion species barriers, Kong et al. inoculated elk CWD into transgenic mice expressing either human PrP or elk PrP. Whereas the elk PrP expressing mice developed disease after only 118-142 days post-inoculation, human PrP expressing mice (129M) did not develop any features of TSE after more than 657 or more than 756 days [41]. In accordance with these results, Tamgüney et al. also reported that human PrP overexpressing mice were not susceptible to 9 CWD isolates from mule deer, white-tailed deer, and elk [84]. However, mice have a limited lifespan and further passages may be necessary to detect low levels of prion infectivity that may be present subclinically. Although indirect evidence is accumulating that there may be a robust species barrier for CWD transmission to humans, one report indicates nonhuman primate susceptibility to CWD. Intracerebral inoculation of squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus) demonstrated a positive CWD transmission [49]. Among non-human primates, however, the Prnp sequence of the new world monkeys are the most distant from humans [72], and therefore may not indicate that human prion conversion would occur by CWD.
snip...
11. Disease control challenges posed by CWD
Evidence is building that indicates efficient horizontal transmission occurs in CWD, indeed a complicating aspect in disease control [91]. Potential transmission mechanisms range from spread via direct contact among animals to environmental exposure through grazing in areas contaminated by prion-infected secretions, excretions (saliva, urine, feces), tissues (placenta), or decomposed carcasses. Recently, in a breakthrough finding, saliva from CWD infected deer was shown to transmit prion disease [50]. An additional experiment by Miller and colleagues showed that CWD-infected carcasses allowed to decay naturally in confined pastures can lead to CWD infections in captive deer, demonstrating the potential for environmental contamination to spread infection [55]. Modelling studies have provided further
support that environmental contamination is likely playing a significant role in transmitting CWD [56, 53]. Additionally, infectious prions have been demonstrated to bind soil particles and remain infectious to animals by both intracerebral and oral exposure routes [38, 37]. Prion infectivity has been recovered from soil more than two years after experimental exposure to prions, suggesting the soil may serve as a reservoir for CWD prions [75]. Taken together, these results indicate that there may even be multiple sources for CWD exposure, perhaps through direct contact and environmental routes. Significant challenges to CWD eradication exist in free-ranging cervids. Infected deer and elk range over a broad geographic region, and even previously surmised geographic barriers such as the Continental Divide have proven passable by infected animals. Ridding the environment of CWD-contaminated soil or even CWD-infected carcasses is not possible. Moreover, the available ante-mortem diagnostic tests for surveillance are laborious and impractical for large numbers of free-ranging animals [74, 88, 95]. Therefore for a wildlife manager, this disease is costly to survey and difficult to control.
12. Conclusion
CWD in cervids is efficiently transmitted, likely more than any other TSE in animals or humans. Therefore, it is unlikely that this TSE can be eradicated, but perhaps through an improved understanding of transmission routes, biological factors influencing pathogenesis, and the molecular basis of CWD prion conversion, a targeted strategy for interrupting disease spread may be developed.
Acknowledgements
I thank Drs. Michael Miller, Jason Bartz and Mathias Heikenwalder for critical review of the manuscript.
snip...see full text 19 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v08092.pdf
SEE FULL TEXT CWD ;
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/04/prion-disease-of-cervids-chronic.html
Thursday, April 03, 2008
A prion disease of cervids: Chronic wasting disease 2008
http://chronic-wasting-disease.blogspot.com/2008/04/prion-disease-of-cervids-chronic.html
Transmissible Mink Encephalopathy TME
http://transmissible-mink-encephalopathy.blogspot.com/
Tuesday, April 29, 2008
Interference at the EPA - Science and Politics at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency
please see full text ;
http://sciencebushwhacked.blogspot.com/
Greetings again Honorable President Young-hui, KIWA (Koreatown Immigrant Workers Alliance), and all Korea,
You might want to communicate these factors of iCJD to your fellow Koreans in the USA who are having medical, surgical and or dental work done. With the many different animal TSEs in the USA of typical and atypical phenotype, the consumption thereof of these TSE infected animals, and the following medical, surgical, and or dental work done on any individual consuming such tainted product, the fact that Koreans are more susceptible to contracting a TSE, one must ponder all these factors ;
Polymorphisms of the prion protein gene (PRNP) in a Korean population Journal Journal of Human Genetics Publisher Springer Japan ISSN 1434-5161 (Print) 1435-232X (Online) Issue Volume 49, Number 6 / June, 2004 Category Short Communication DOI 10.1007/s10038-004-0150-7 Pages 319-324 Subject Collection Biomedical and Life Sciences SpringerLink Date Monday, May 17, 2004
Byung-Hoon Jeong1, Jae-Hwan Nam2, Yun-Jung Lee1, Kyung-Hee Lee1, Myoung-Kuk Jang1, Richard I. Carp3, Ho-Dong Lee2, Young-Ran Ju2, Sangmee Ahn Jo2, Keun-Yong Park2 and Yong-Sun Kim1, 4
(1) Ilsong Institute of Life Science, Hallym University, Ilsong Building, 1605-4, Gwanyang-dong, Dongan-gu, Anyang, Kyounggi-do, 431-060, South Korea (2) Department of Virology, Korea National Institute of Health, Eunpyung-gu, Seoul, 122-701, South Korea (3) New York State Institute for Basic Research in Developmental Disabilities, Staten Island, NY 10314, USA (4) Department of Microbiology, College of Medicine, Hallym University, 1605-4, Gwanyang-dong, Dongan-gu, Anyang, Kyounggi-do, 431-060, South Korea
Received: 7 January 2004 Accepted: 5 March 2004 Published online: 18 May 2004
Abstract Human prion protein gene (PRNP) has been considered to be involved in the susceptibility of humans to prion diseases. Polymorphisms of methionine (Met)/valine (Val) at codon 129 and of glutamic acid (Glu)/lysine (Lys) at codon 219 are thought to play an important role in susceptibility to sporadic, iatrogenic and variant Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD). Although the genotype distribution of polymorphisms in PRNP open reading frame (ORF) has been reported in many European populations, among Asian groups, it has been reported only in the Japanese population. We examined the PRNP polymorphisms in 529 healthy Koreans. We observed that genotype frequencies at codon 129 was 94.33% Met/Met, 5.48% Met/Val, and 0.19% Val/Val with an allele frequency of 0.971:0.029 Met:Val, and that genotype frequencies at codon 219 was 92.06% Glu/Glu, 7.94% Glu/Lys, and 0% Lys/Lys with an allele frequency of 0.96:0.04 Glu:Lys. The frequencies of the Glu/Glu genotype (2=10.075, P=0.0015) and of the Glu allele (2=9.486, P=0.0021) at codon 219 were significantly higher in the Korean population than the Japanese population. In addition, the genotype frequency of heterozygotes (12.7%) at codons 129 or/and 219 was significantly lower in Koreans than in people from Great Britain (2=89.52, P<0.0001).
European Journal of Human Genetics (2005) 13, 1094–1097. doi:10.1038/sj.ejhg.5201460; published online 29 June 2005
Polymorphism at 3' UTR +28 of the prion-like protein gene is associated with sporadic Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease Byung-Hoon Jeong1, Nam-Ho Kim1, Eun-Kyoung Choi1, Chaeyoung Lee1, Young-Han Song1, Jae-Il Kim2, Richard I Carp2 and Yong-Sun Kim1,3
1Ilsong Institute of Life Science, Hallym University, 1605-4 Gwanyang-dong
snip...
Our results are the first genetic association study of the PRND noncoding region with sporadic CJD. Recently, we reported that the distributions of codons 129 and 219 genotypes of PRNP in a Korean population differ significantly from those reported for other ethnic groups.24 Thus, further investigations in different ethnic groups including Europeans will be necessary to assess association between sporadic CJD and the PRND 3' UTR +28 polymorphism. Furthermore, since it is unknown whether this polymorphism affects mRNA stability or gene expression of PRND, further experiments should be conducted to clarify the role of this polymorphism in PRND function.
http://www.nature.com/ejhg/journal/v13/n9/full/5201460a.html
iatrogenic Creutzfeldt Jakob Disease
Reports of incidents of potential iatrogenic exposure to CJD via surgery: 01 January 2000 to 31 Dec 2007
There were a total of 329 incidents reported during this period (table 1). Eleven surgical incidents were reported between 1 July and 31 December 2007 (since the previous update report). A surgical incident occurs when a patient undergoes surgery but is only identified as having CJD or being at risk of CJD at a later date. This means that the Advisory Committee on Dangerous Pathogens (ACDP) transmissible spongiform encephalopathy working group infection control guidelines would not have been followed. The surgery carried out on an index patient with, or at risk of, CJD may result in contamination of the instruments with abnormal prion protein. Table 1 shows the number of CJD surgical incidents reported to the CJD Incidents Panel from January 2000 to December 2007 by the diagnosis of the index patient.
Table 1 CJD Surgical Incidents (n=329) reported to the CJD Incidents Panel, by diagnosis of index patient: January 2000 to Dec 2007
snip... see full text ;
http://www.hpa.org.uk/hpr/infections/ei_cjd.htm#cjd
Wednesday, January 02, 2008 Risk factors for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease Wednesday, January 02, 2008 Risk factors for sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob disease
FURTHER INTO THIS STUDY ;
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/risk-factors-for-sporadic-creutzfeldt.html
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2007/12/risk-factors-for-sporadic-creutzfeldt.html
Monday, December 31, 2007 Risk Assessment of Transmission of Sporadic Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease in Endodontic Practice in Absence of Adequate Prion Inactivation
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2007/12/risk-assessment-of-transmission-of.html
Wednesday, June 4, 2008
SEAC 2008 ONE HUNDREDTH MEETING OF THE SPONGIFORM ENCEPHALOPATHY ADVISORY COMMITTEE
http://seac992007.blogspot.com/2008/06/seac-2008-one-hundredth-meeting-of.html
summary
In summary, although this young woman clearly died of a prion disease, we could not conclude she had vCJD, but also we could not be sure this was sporadic CJD either. Although we were not able to make definite conclusions on the basis of a single patient, we felt it important to report this tragic death and these findings in the medical literature so as to bring this to the attention of other doctors who might see similar patients in the future. This unusual finding reminds us of the importance of keeping alert to the possibility that BSE prions will cause disease in individuals with different genetic types, who may develop a disease that may resemble sporadic CJD, or vCJD, or have a new pattern of disease. This work emphasises the importance of continuing to study the rogue prion protein type in patients and we thank all patients and families who have kindly consented to use their, or their loved one’s, tissues for this medical research.
Reference: Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Prion Protein Gene Codon 129VV, and a Novel PrPSc Type in a Young British Woman Simon Mead; Susan Joiner; Melanie Desbruslais; Jonathan A. Beck; Michael O’ Donoghue; Peter Lantos; Jonathan D. F. Wadsworth; John Collinge Arch Neurol. 2007;64(12):1780-1784.
www.cjdsupport.net Newsletter issue 17 april 2008
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease, Prion Protein Gene Codon 129VV, and a Novel PrPSc ype in a Young British Woman
http://creutzfeldt-jakob-disease.blogspot.com/2008/01/creutzfeldt-jakob-disease-prion-protein.html
And last but not least, similarities of PrPres between Htype BSE and human prion diseases like CJD or GSS have been put forward [10], as well as between L-type BSE and CJD [17]. These findings raise questions about the origin and inter species transmission of these prion diseases that were discovered through the BSE active surveillance.
full text 18 pages ;
http://www.vetres.org/index.php?option=article&access=standard&Itemid=129&url=/articles/vetres/pdf/2008/04/v07232.pdf
Thursday, June 05, 2008
Review on the epidemiology and dynamics of BSE epidemics
http://bse-atypical.blogspot.com/2008/06/review-on-epidemiology-and-dynamics-of.html
The statistical incidence of CJD cases in the United States has been *** revised *** to reflect that there is one case per 9000 in adults age 55 and older. Eighty-five percent of the cases are sporadic, meaning there is no known cause at present.
http://www.cjdfoundation.org/fact.html
SIGN THE PETITION TODAY, it may be the only recourse for the USA consumer to finally get USA beef tested for BSE. We must stand together and demand a safer BSE free beef product
http://www.stopmadcow.org/
Terry S. Singeltary Sr.
P.O. Box 42
Bacliff, Texas USA 77518
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